SUBCHAPTER IV—COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE
§3361. National Virtual Translation Center
(a) Establishment
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish in the intelligence community an element with the function of connecting the elements of the intelligence community engaged in the acquisition, storage, translation, or analysis of voice or data in digital form.
(b) Designation
The element established under subsection (a) shall be known as the National Virtual Translation Center.
(c) Function
The element established under subsection (a) shall provide for timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence for all elements of the intelligence community through—
(1) the integration of the translation capabilities of the intelligence community;
(2) the use of remote-connection capabilities; and
(3) the use of such other capabilities as the Director considers appropriate.
(d) Administrative matters
(1) The Director shall retain direct supervision and control over the element established under subsection (a).
(2) The element established under subsection (a) shall connect elements of the intelligence community utilizing the most current available information technology that is applicable to the function of the element.
(3) Personnel of the element established under subsection (a) may carry out the duties and functions of the element at any location that—
(A) has been certified as a secure facility by a department or agency of the United States Government; or
(B) the Director has otherwise determined to be appropriate for such duties and functions.
(e) Deadline for establishment
The element required by subsection (a) shall be established as soon as practicable after November 27, 2002, but not later than 90 days after November 27, 2002.
(
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (d)(3)(B).
2004—Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
§3362. Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center
(a) Establishment
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish within the Central Intelligence Agency an element responsible for conducting all-source intelligence analysis of information relating to the financial capabilities, practices, and activities of individuals, groups, and nations associated with international terrorism in their activities relating to international terrorism.
(b) Designation
The element established under subsection (a) shall be known as the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center.
(c) Deadline for establishment
The element required by subsection (a) shall be established as soon as practicable after November 27, 2002, but not later than 90 days after November 27, 2002.
(
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2004—Subsec. (a).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
§3363. Terrorist Identification Classification System
(a) Requirement
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall—
(A) establish and maintain a list of individuals who are known or suspected international terrorists, and of organizations that are known or suspected international terrorist organizations; and
(B) ensure that pertinent information on the list is shared with the departments, agencies, and organizations described by subsection (c).
(2) The list under paragraph (1), and the mechanisms for sharing information on the list, shall be known as the "Terrorist Identification Classification System".
(b) Administration
(1) The Director shall prescribe requirements for the inclusion of an individual or organization on the list required by subsection (a), and for the deletion or omission from the list of an individual or organization currently on the list.
(2) The Director shall ensure that the information utilized to determine the inclusion, or deletion or omission, of an individual or organization on or from the list is derived from all-source intelligence.
(3) The Director shall ensure that the list is maintained in accordance with existing law and regulations governing the collection, storage, and dissemination of intelligence concerning United States persons.
(c) Information sharing
Subject to
(d) Report on criteria for information sharing
(1) Not later than March 1, 2003, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the criteria used to determine which types of information on the list required by subsection (a) are to be shared, and which types of information are not to be shared, with various departments and agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies, and entities of foreign governments and international organizations.
(2) The report shall include a description of the circumstances in which the Director has determined that sharing information on the list with the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and of State and local governments, described by subsection (c) would be inappropriate due to the concerns addressed by section 403–3(c)(7) 1 of this title, relating to the protection of sources and methods, and any instance in which the sharing of information on the list has been inappropriate in light of such concerns.
(e) System administration requirements
(1) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, ensure the interoperability of the Terrorist Identification Classification System with relevant information systems of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and of State and local governments, described by subsection (c).
(2) The Director shall ensure that the System utilizes technologies that are effective in aiding the identification of individuals in the field.
(f) Report on status of System
(1) Not later than one year after November 27, 2002, the Director shall, in consultation with the Director of Homeland Security, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the status of the Terrorist Identification Classification System. The report shall contain a certification on the following:
(A) Whether the System contains the intelligence information necessary to facilitate the contribution of the System to the domestic security of the United States.
(B) Whether the departments and agencies having access to the System have access in a manner that permits such departments and agencies to carry out appropriately their domestic security responsibilities.
(C) Whether the System is operating in a manner that maximizes its contribution to the domestic security of the United States.
(D) If a certification under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) is in the negative, the modifications or enhancements of the System necessary to ensure a future certification in the positive.
(2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(g) Congressional intelligence committees defined
In this section, the term "congressional intelligence committees" means—
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (d)(1).
2010—Subsecs. (d) to (h).
"(1) The Director shall review on an annual basis the information provided by various departments and agencies for purposes of the list under subsection (a) in order to determine whether or not the information so provided is derived from the widest possible range of intelligence available to such departments and agencies.
"(2) The Director shall, as a result of each review under paragraph (1), certify whether or not the elements of the intelligence community responsible for the collection of intelligence related to the list have provided information for purposes of the list that is derived from the widest possible range of intelligence available to such department and agencies."
2004—Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (c).
2003—Subsecs. (c), (e)(2).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 2004 Amendment
For Determination by President that amendment by
Amendment by
1 See References in Text note below.
§3364. Assignment of responsibilities relating to analytic integrity
(a) Assignment of responsibilities
For purposes of carrying out
(b) Responsibilities
(1) The individual or entity assigned responsibility under subsection (a)—
(A) may be responsible for general oversight and management of analysis and production, but may not be directly responsible for, or involved in, the specific production of any finished intelligence product;
(B) shall perform, on a regular basis, detailed reviews of finished intelligence product or other analytic products by an element or elements of the intelligence community covering a particular topic or subject matter;
(C) shall be responsible for identifying on an annual basis functional or topical areas of analysis for specific review under subparagraph (B); and
(D) upon completion of any review under subparagraph (B), may draft lessons learned, identify best practices, or make recommendations for improvement to the analytic tradecraft employed in the production of the reviewed product or products.
(2) Each review under paragraph (1)(B) should—
(A) include whether the product or products concerned were based on all sources of available intelligence, properly describe the quality and reliability of underlying sources, properly caveat and express uncertainties or confidence in analytic judgments, properly distinguish between underlying intelligence and the assumptions and judgments of analysts, and incorporate, where appropriate, alternative analyses; and
(B) ensure that the analytic methodologies, tradecraft, and practices used by the element or elements concerned in the production of the product or products concerned meet the standards set forth in subsection (a).
(3) Information drafted under paragraph (1)(D) should, as appropriate, be included in analysis teaching modules and case studies for use throughout the intelligence community.
(c) Annual briefings
Not later than December 1 each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of analytic training departments a briefing with a description, and the associated findings, of each review under subsection (b)(1)(B) during such year.
(d) Congressional intelligence committees defined
In this section, the term "congressional intelligence committees" means—
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2019—Subsec. (c).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date
For Determination by President that section take effect on Apr. 21, 2005, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Apr. 21, 2005, 70 F.R. 23925, set out as a note under
Section effective not later than six months after Dec. 17, 2004, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 1097(a) of
Annual Training Requirement and Report Regarding Analytic Standards
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(d)
"(1)
"(2)
"(e)
"(f)
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6312 of
Safeguard of Objectivity in Intelligence Analysis
"(a)
"(b)
§3365. Foreign intelligence information
(1) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in
(2) Definition
In this section, the term "foreign intelligence information" means—
(A) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against—
(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or
(iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(B) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to—
(i) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
(
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified to
Amendments
2023—Par. (1).
2002—Par. (1).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of
Effective Date of 2002 Amendment
Amendment by
§3366. Authorities of heads of other departments and agencies
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of any department or agency of the United States is authorized to receive and utilize funds made available to the department or agency by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Subsection (a), referred to in text, is subsec. (a) of section 402 of
Codification
Section was formerly classified as a note under
§3367. Requirement for efficient use by intelligence community of open-source intelligence
The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the intelligence community makes efficient and effective use of open-source information and analysis.
(
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly classified as a note under
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Intelligence Community Directive With Respect to Open-Source Intelligence
"(d)
"(1) the production and dissemination of unclassified intelligence products derived entirely from open-source intelligence, including from unclassified publicly available information, unclassified commercially available information, or any other type of unclassified information; and
"(2) the needs and requirements of covered individuals who do not hold a security clearance or have access to the classified systems on which such unclassified intelligence products reside.
"(e)
"(1)
"(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
"(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
"(C) the Committee on Oversight and Accountability, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(A) who is not an employee or contractor of an element of the intelligence community; and
"(B) who would derive value from a covered open-source intelligence product.
"(3)
[For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 7321(d), (e) of
Assessing Intelligence Community Open-Source Support for Export Controls and Foreign Investment Screening
"(a)
"(1)
"(A) to the Department of Commerce to support the export control and investment screening functions of the Department; and
"(B) to the Department of Homeland Security to support the export control functions of the Department.
"(2)
"(A) shall establish a process for the provision of information as described in such paragraph; and
"(B) may—
"(i) acquire and prepare data, consistent with applicable provisions of law and Executive orders;
"(ii) modernize analytic systems, including through the acquisition, development, or application of automated tools; and
"(iii) establish standards and policies regarding the acquisition, treatment, and sharing of open source, publicly and commercially available information.
"(3)
"(b)
"(1)
"(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
"(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(A)
"(B)
"(i) A list, developed in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, of the activities of the Department of Commerce and the Department of Homeland Security that will be supported by the pilot program.
"(ii) A plan for measuring the effectiveness of the pilot program and the value of open source, publicly and commercially available information to the export control and investment screening missions.
"(3)
"(A)
"(B)
"(i) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of providing information as described in subsection (a)(1).
"(ii) An assessment of the value of open source, publicly and commercially available information to the export control and investment screening missions, using the measures of effectiveness under paragraph (2)(B)(ii).
"(iii) Identification of opportunities for and barriers to more effective use of open source, publicly and commercially available information by the intelligence community."
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 6311 of
§3368. Assistance for governmental entities and private entities in recognizing online violent extremist content
(a) Assistance to recognize online violent extremist content
Not later than 180 days after May 5, 2017, and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National Intelligence shall publish on a publicly available Internet website a list of all logos, symbols, insignia, and other markings commonly associated with, or adopted by, an organization designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization under
(b) Updates
The Director shall update the list published under subsection (a) every 180 days until December 22, 2023.
(
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (b).
§3369. Cooperative actions to detect and counter foreign influence operations
(a) Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Russian Federation, through military intelligence units, also known as the "GRU", and Kremlin-linked troll organizations often referred to as the "Internet Research Agency", deploy information warfare operations against the United States, its allies and partners, with the goal of advancing the strategic interests of the Russian Federation.
(2) One line of effort deployed as part of these information warfare operations is the weaponization of social media platforms with the goals of intensifying societal tensions, undermining trust in governmental institutions within the United States, its allies and partners in the West, and generally sowing division, fear, and confusion.
(3) These information warfare operations are a threat to the national security of the United States and that of the allies and partners of the United States. As former Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats stated, "These actions are persistent, they are pervasive and they are meant to undermine America's democracy.".
(4) These information warfare operations continue to evolve and increase in sophistication.
(5) Other foreign adversaries and hostile non-state actors are increasingly adopting similar tactics of deploying information warfare operations against the West, such as recent state-backed operations from China around the Hong Kong protests identified by social media companies.
(6) Technological advances, including artificial intelligence, will only make it more difficult in the future to detect fraudulent accounts, deceptive material posted on social media, and malign behavior on social media platforms.
(7) Because these information warfare operations are deployed within and across private social media platforms, the companies that own these platforms have a responsibility to detect and facilitate the removal or neutralization of foreign adversary networks operating clandestinely on their platforms.
(8) The social media companies are inherently technologically sophisticated and adept at rapidly analyzing large amounts of data and developing software-based solutions to diverse and ever-changing challenges on their platforms, which makes them well-equipped to address the threat occurring on their platforms.
(9) Independent analyses confirmed Kremlin-linked threat networks, based on data provided by several social media companies to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, thereby demonstrating that it is possible to discern both broad patterns of cross-platform information warfare operations and specific fraudulent behavior on social media platforms.
(10) General Paul Nakasone, Director of the National Security Agency, emphasized the importance of these independent analyses to the planning and conducting of military cyber operations to frustrate Kremlin-linked information warfare operations against the 2018 mid-term elections. General Nakasone stated that the reports "were very, very helpful in terms of being able to understand exactly what our adversary was trying to do to build dissent within our nation.".
(11) Institutionalizing ongoing robust, independent, and vigorous analysis of data related to foreign threat networks within and across social media platforms will help counter ongoing information warfare operations against the United States, its allies, and its partners.
(12) Archiving and disclosing to the public the results of these analyses by the social media companies and trusted third-party experts in a transparent manner will serve to demonstrate that the social media companies are detecting and removing foreign malign activities from their platforms while protecting the privacy of the people of the United States and will build public understanding of the scale and scope of these foreign threats to our democracy, since exposure is one of the most effective means to build resilience.
(b) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the social media companies should cooperate among themselves and with independent organizations and researchers on a sustained and regular basis to share and analyze data and indicators relevant to foreign information warfare operations within and across their platforms in order to detect and counter foreign information warfare operations that threaten the national security of the United States and its allies and partners;
(2) information from law enforcement and the intelligence community is also important in assisting efforts by these social media companies to identify foreign information warfare operations;
(3) these analytic efforts should be organized in such a fashion as to meet the highest standards of ethics, confidentiality, and privacy protection of the people of the United States, while still allowing timely research access to relevant data;
(4) these analytic efforts should be undertaken as soon as possible to facilitate countering ongoing state or state-backed foreign information warfare operations and to aid in preparations for the United States Presidential and congressional elections in 2020 and beyond;
(5) the structure and operations of social media companies make them well positioned to work with independent organizations and researchers to address foreign adversary threat networks within and across their platforms, and these efforts could be conducted without direct Government involvement, direction, or regulation; and
(6) if the social media industry fails to take sufficient action to address foreign adversary threat networks operating within or across their platforms, Congress would have to consider additional safeguards for ensuring that this threat is effectively mitigated.
(c) Requirement to facilitate establishment of Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center
(1) Requirement
Not later than June 1, 2021, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall facilitate, by grant or contract or under an existing authority of the Director, the establishment of a Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center with the functions described in paragraph (2) at an independent, nonprofit organization.
(2) Functions
The functions described in this paragraph are the following:
(A) Acting as a convening and sponsoring authority for cooperative social media data analysis of foreign threat networks involving social media companies and third-party experts, nongovernmental organizations, data journalists, Federally funded research and development centers, academic researchers, traditional media, and international counterparts, as appropriate.
(B) Facilitating analysis of foreign influence operation, within and across the individual social media platforms as well as hacking and leaking campaigns, and other tactics, and related unlawful activities that fund or subsidize such operations.
(C) Developing processes to share information from government entities on foreign influence operations with the individual social media companies to inform threat analysis, and working with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as appropriate.
(D) Determining and making public criteria for identifying which companies, organizations, or researchers qualify for inclusion in the activities of the Center, and inviting entities that fit the criteria to join.
(E) Determining jointly with the social media companies what data and metadata related to indicators of foreign adversary threat networks from their platforms and business operations will be made available for access and analysis.
(F) Developing and making public the criteria and standards that must be met for companies, other organizations, and individual researchers to access and analyze data relating to foreign adversary threat networks within and across social media platforms and publish or otherwise use the results.
(G) Developing and making public the ethical standards for investigation of foreign threat networks and use of analytic results and for protection of the privacy of the customers and users of the social media platforms and of the proprietary information of the social media companies.
(H) Developing technical, contractual, and procedural controls to prevent misuse of data, including any necessary auditing procedures, compliance checks, and review mechanisms.
(I) Developing and making public criteria and conditions under which the Center shall share information with the appropriate Government agencies regarding threats to national security from, or violations of the law involving, foreign activities on social media platforms.
(J) Hosting a searchable archive aggregating information related to foreign influence and disinformation operations to build a collective understanding of the threats and facilitate future examination consistent with privacy protections.
(K) Developing data standards to harmonize the sharing of information pursuant to this paragraph.
(d) Reporting and notifications
The Director of the Center shall—
(1) not later than August 1, 2021, submit to appropriate congressional committees a report on—
(A) the estimated funding needs of the Center for fiscal year 2021 and for subsequent years;
(B) such statutory protections from liability as the Director considers necessary for the Center, participating social media companies, and participating third-party analytical participants;
(C) such statutory penalties as the Director considers necessary to ensure against misuse of data by researchers; and
(D) such changes to the Center's mission to fully capture broader unlawful activities that intersect with, complement, or support information warfare tactics; and
(2) not less frequently than once each year, submit to the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the appropriate congressional committees a report—
(A) that assesses—
(i) degree of cooperation and commitment from the social media companies to the mission of the Center; and
(ii) effectiveness of the Center in detecting and facilitating the removal or neutralization of clandestine foreign information warfare operations from social media platforms; and
(B) includes such recommendations for legislative or administrative action as the Center considers appropriate to carry out the functions of the Center.
(e) Periodic reporting to the public
The Director of the Center shall—
(1) once each quarter, make available to the public a report on key trends in foreign influence and disinformation operations, including any threats to campaigns and elections, to inform the public of the United States; and
(2) as the Director considers necessary, provide more timely assessments relating to ongoing disinformation campaigns.
(f) Foreign malign influence campaigns on social media platforms targeting elections for Federal office
(1) Reports
(A) Requirement
Not later than 90 days before the date of each regularly scheduled general election for Federal office, the Director of the Center shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on foreign malign influence campaigns on and across social media platforms targeting such election.
(B) Matters included
Each report under subparagraph (A) shall include an analysis of the following:
(i) The patterns, tools, and techniques of foreign malign influence campaigns across all platforms on social media by a covered foreign country targeting a regularly scheduled general election for Federal office.
(ii) Inauthentic accounts and "bot" networks across platforms, including the scale to which such accounts or networks exist, how platforms currently act to remove such accounts or networks, and what percentage of such accounts or networks have been removed during the period covered by the report.
(iii) The estimated reach and impact of intentional or weaponized disinformation by inauthentic accounts and "bot" networks, including an analysis of amplification by users and algorithmic distribution.
(iv) The trends of types of media that are being used for dissemination through foreign malign influence campaigns, including machine-manipulated media, and the intended targeted groups.
(C) Initial report
Not later than August 1, 2021, the Director of the Center shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report under subparagraph (A) addressing the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office occurring during 2020.
(D) Form
Each report under this paragraph shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(2) Briefings
(A) Requirement
Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report under paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall provide to such committees a briefing assessing threats from foreign malign influence campaigns on social media from covered countries to the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office covered by the report.
(B) Matters to be included
Each briefing under subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
(i) The patterns, tools, and techniques of foreign malign influence campaigns across all platforms on social media by a covered foreign country targeting a regularly scheduled general election for Federal office.
(ii) An assessment of the findings from the report for which the briefing is provided.
(iii) The activities and methods used to mitigate the threats associated with such findings by the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, or other relevant departments or agencies of the Federal Government.
(iv) The steps taken by departments or agencies of the Federal Government to cooperate with social media companies to mitigate the threats identified.
(g) Funding
Of the amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the National Intelligence Program (as defined in
(h) Definitions
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(2) Covered foreign country and foreign malign influence
The terms "covered foreign country" and "foreign malign influence" have the meanings given those terms in
(3) Machine-manipulated media
The term "machine-manipulated media" has the meaning given that term in section 5724.1
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 5724, referred to in subsec. (h)(3), is section 5724 of
Amendments
2021—
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (c)(1).
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (d)(1).
Subsec. (f).
Subsec. (g).
Subsec. (h).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definition of "intelligence community", referred to subsec. (b)(2), see section 5003 of div. E of
1 See References in Text note below.
§3369a. Report on deepfake technology, foreign weaponization of deepfakes, and related notifications
(a) Report on foreign weaponization of deepfakes and deepfake technology
(1) Report required
Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on—
(A) the potential national security impacts of machine-manipulated media (commonly known as "deepfakes"); and
(B) the actual or potential use of machine-manipulated media by foreign governments to spread disinformation or engage in other malign activities.
(2) Matters to be included
The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(A) An assessment of the technical capabilities of foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, with respect to machine-manipulated media, machine-generated text, generative adversarial networks, and related machine-learning technologies, including—
(i) an assessment of the technical capabilities of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation with respect to the production and detection of machine-manipulated media; and
(ii) an annex describing those governmental elements within China and Russia known to have supported or facilitated machine-manipulated media research, development, or dissemination, as well as any civil-military fusion, private-sector, academic, or nongovernmental entities which have meaningfully participated in such activities.
(B) An updated assessment of how foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, could use or are using machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text to harm the national security interests of the United States, including an assessment of the historic, current, or potential future efforts of China and Russia to use machine-manipulated media, including with respect to—
(i) the overseas or domestic dissemination of misinformation;
(ii) the attempted discrediting of political opponents or disfavored populations; and
(iii) intelligence or influence operations directed against the United States, allies or partners of the United States, or other jurisdictions believed to be subject to Chinese or Russian interference.
(C) An updated identification of the countertechnologies that have been or could be developed and deployed by the United States Government, or by the private sector with Government support, to deter, detect, and attribute the use of machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text by foreign governments, foreign-government affiliates, or foreign individuals, along with an analysis of the benefits, limitations and drawbacks of such identified counter-technologies, including any emerging concerns related to privacy.
(D) An identification of the offices within the elements of the intelligence community that have, or should have, lead responsibility for monitoring the development of, use of, and response to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text, including—
(i) a description of the coordination of such efforts across the intelligence community;
(ii) a detailed description of the existing capabilities, tools, and relevant expertise of such elements to determine whether a piece of media has been machine manipulated or machine generated, including the speed at which such determination can be made, the confidence level of the element in the ability to make such a determination accurately, and how increasing volume and improved quality of machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text may negatively impact such capabilities; and
(iii) a detailed description of planned or ongoing research and development efforts intended to improve the ability of the intelligence community to detect machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text.
(E) A description of any research and development activities carried out or under consideration to be carried out by the intelligence community, including the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, relevant to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text detection technologies.
(F) Updated recommendations regarding whether the intelligence community requires additional legal authorities, financial resources, or specialized personnel to address the national security threat posed by machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text.
(G) Other additional information the Director determines appropriate.
(b) Form
The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Requirement for notification
The Director of National Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of any other relevant departments or agencies of the Federal Government, shall notify the congressional intelligence committees each time the Director of National Intelligence determines—
(1) there is credible information or intelligence that a foreign entity has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt to deploy machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text aimed at the elections or domestic political processes of the United States; and
(2) that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign government, a foreign government-affiliated entity, or a foreign individual.
(d) Definitions
(1) Machine-generated text
The term "machine-generated text" means text generated using machine-learning techniques in order to resemble writing in natural language.
(2) Machine-manipulated media
The term "machine-manipulated media" has the meaning given that term in section 5724.1
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Section 5724, referred to in subsec. (d)(2), means section 5724 of
Amendments
2022—Subsecs. (d), (e).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in text, see section 5003 of div. E of
1 See References in Text note below.
§3369b. Oversight of foreign influence in academia
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Covered institution of higher education
The term "covered institution of higher education" means an institution described in
(2) Sensitive research subject
The term "sensitive research subject" means a subject of research that is carried out at a covered institution of higher education that receives funds that were appropriated for—
(A) the National Intelligence Program; or
(B) any Federal agency the Director of National Intelligence deems appropriate.
(b) Report required
Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, and not less frequently than once each year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate and consistent with the privacy protections afforded to United States persons, shall submit to congressional intelligence committees a report on risks to sensitive research subjects posed by foreign entities in order to provide Congress and covered institutions of higher education with more complete information on these risks and to help ensure academic freedom.
(c) Contents
The report required by subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1) A list of sensitive research subjects that could affect national security.
(2) A list of foreign entities, including governments, corporations, nonprofit organizations and for-profit organizations, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity, that the Director determines pose a counterintelligence, espionage (including economic espionage), or other national security threat with respect to sensitive research subjects.
(3) A list of any known or suspected attempts by foreign entities to exert pressure on covered institutions of higher education, including attempts to limit freedom of speech, propagate misinformation or disinformation, or to influence professors, researchers, or students.
(4) Recommendations for collaboration between covered institutions of higher education and the intelligence community to mitigate threats to sensitive research subjects associated with foreign influence in academia, including any necessary legislative or administrative action.
(d) Congressional notifications required
Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director identifies a change to either list described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c), the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the change.
(
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in text, see section 5003 of div. E of
§3369c. Notification of an active measures campaign
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership
The term "congressional leadership" includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(b) Requirement for notification
The Director of National Intelligence, in cooperation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the head of any other relevant agency, shall notify the congressional leadership and the chairman and vice chairman or ranking member of each of the appropriate congressional committees, and of other relevant committees of jurisdiction, each time the Director of National Intelligence determines there is credible information that a foreign power has, is, or will attempt to employ a covert influence or active measures campaign with regard to the modernization, employment, doctrine, or force posture of the nuclear deterrent or missile defense.
(c) Content of notification
Each notification required by subsection (b) shall include information concerning actions taken by the United States to expose or halt an attempt referred to in subsection (b).
(
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definition of "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in subsec. (a)(1)(A), see section 5003 of div. E of
§3369d. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence over peoples and governments
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence
The term "active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence" means activities intended to influence a person or government that are carried out in coordination with, or at the behest of, political leaders or the security services of the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state and the role of the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state has been hidden or not acknowledged publicly, including the following:
(A) Establishment or funding of a front group.
(B) Covert broadcasting.
(C) Media manipulation.
(D) Disinformation and forgeries.
(E) Funding agents of influence.
(F) Incitement and offensive counterintelligence.
(G) Assassinations.
(H) Terrorist acts.
(2) Appropriate committees of Congress
The term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b) Establishment
There is established within the executive branch an interagency committee to counter active measures by the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence.
(c) Membership
(1) In general
(A) Appointment
Each head of an agency or department of the Government set out under subparagraph (B) shall appoint one member of the committee established by subsection (b) from among officials of such agency or department who occupy a position that is required to be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(B) Head of an agency or department
The head of an agency or department of the Government set out under this subparagraph are the following:
(i) The Director of National Intelligence.
(ii) The Secretary of State.
(iii) The Secretary of Defense.
(iv) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(v) The Attorney General.
(vi) The Secretary of Energy.
(vii) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(viii) The head of any other agency or department of the United States Government designated by the President for purposes of this section.
(d) Meetings
The committee shall meet on a regular basis.
(e) Duties
The duties of the committee established by subsection (b) shall be as follows:
(1) To counter active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence, including by exposing falsehoods, agents of influence, corruption, human rights abuses, terrorism, and assassinations carried out by the security services or political elites of the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state or their proxies.
(2) Such other duties as the President may designate for purposes of this section.
(f) Staff
The committee established by subsection (b) may employ such staff as the members of such committee consider appropriate.
(g) Budget Request
A request for funds required for the functioning of the committee established by subsection (b) may be included in each budget for a fiscal year submitted by the President pursuant to
(h) Annual report
(1) Requirement
Not later than 180 days after May 5, 2017, and annually thereafter, and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the committee established by subsection (b) shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report describing steps being taken by the committee to counter active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence.
(2) Content
Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A summary of the active measures by the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence during the previous year, including significant incidents and notable trends.
(B) A description of the key initiatives of the committee.
(C) A description of the implementation of the committee's initiatives by the head of an agency or department of the Government set out under subsection (c)(1)(B).
(D) An analysis of the impact of the committee's initiatives.
(E) Recommendations for changes to the committee's initiatives from the previous year.
(3) Separate reporting requirement
The requirement to submit an annual report under paragraph (1) is in addition to any other reporting requirements with respect to Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state.
(
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section was formerly set out as a note under
Amendments
2019—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definition of "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in subsec. (a)(2)(A), see section 2 of div. N of
§3370. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force
(a) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives.
(b) Requirement to establish
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish a Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force to standardize information sharing between the intelligence community and the acquisition community of the United States Government with respect to the supply chain and counterintelligence risks.
(c) Members
The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall be composed of—
(1) a representative of the Defense Security Service of the Department of Defense;
(2) a representative of the General Services Administration;
(3) a representative of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy of the Office of Management and Budget;
(4) a representative of the Department of Homeland Security;
(5) a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(6) the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center; and
(7) any other members the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.
(d) Security clearances
Each member of the Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall have a security clearance at the top secret level and be able to access sensitive compartmented information.
(e) Annual report
The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report that describes the activities of the Task Force during the previous year, including identification of the supply chain, cybersecurity, and counterintelligence risks shared with the acquisition community of the United States Government by the intelligence community.
(
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Change of Name
Committee on Oversight and Reform of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Oversight and Accountability of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 5, One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, Jan. 9, 2023.
Definitions
For definitions of "congressional intelligence committees" and "intelligence community", referred to in text, see section 5003 of div. E of
§3370a. Biennial report on foreign investment risks
(a) Intelligence community interagency working group
(1) Requirement to establish
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish an intelligence community interagency working group to prepare the biennial reports required by subsection (b).
(2) Chairperson
The Director of National Intelligence shall serve as the chairperson of such interagency working group.
(3) Membership
Such interagency working group shall be composed of representatives of each element of the intelligence community that the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.
(b) Biennial report on foreign investment risks
(1) Report required
Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, and not less frequently than once every 2 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on foreign investment risks prepared by the interagency working group established under subsection (a).
(2) Elements
Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include identification, analysis, and explanation of the following:
(A) Any current or projected major threats to the national security of the United States with respect to foreign investment.
(B) Any strategy used by a foreign country that such interagency working group has identified to be a country of special concern to use foreign investment to target the acquisition of critical technologies, critical materials, or critical infrastructure.
(C) Any economic espionage efforts directed at the United States by a foreign country, particularly such a country of special concern.
(c) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in text, see section 5003 of div. E of
§3370b. Collaboration between intelligence community and Department of Commerce to counter foreign commercial threats
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Foreign commercial threat
(A) In general
The term "foreign commercial threat" means a rare commercial item or service that is produced by, offered by, sold by, licensed by, or otherwise distributed under the control of a strategic competitor or foreign adversary in a manner that may provide the strategic competitor or foreign adversary leverage over an intended recipient.
(B) Determinations by Working Group
In determining whether an item or service is a foreign commercial threat, the Working Group shall consider whether the strategic competitor or foreign adversary could—
(i) withhold, or threaten to withhold, the rare commercial item or service;
(ii) create reliance on the rare commercial item or service as essential to the safety, health, or economic wellbeing of the intended recipient; or
(iii) have its rare commercial item or service easily replaced by a United States entity or an entity of an ally or partner of the United States.
(3) Rare commercial item or service
The term "rare commercial item or service" means a good, service, or intellectual property that is not widely available for distribution.
(b) Working Group
(1) Establishment
Unless the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce make the joint determination specified in subsection (c), the Director and the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall jointly establish a working group to counter foreign commercial threats (in this section referred to as the "Working Group").
(2) Membership
The composition of the Working Group may include any officer or employee of a department or agency of the United States Government determined appropriate by the Director or the Secretary.
(3) Duties
The duties of the Working Group shall be the following:
(A) To identify current foreign commercial threats.
(B) To identify probable future foreign commercial threats.
(C) To identify goods, services, or intellectual property that, if produced by entities within the United States, or allies or partners of the United States, would mitigate foreign commercial threats.
(4) Meetings
Not later than 30 days after December 23, 2022, and on a regular basis that is not less frequently than quarterly thereafter until the date of termination under paragraph (5), the Working Group shall meet.
(5) Termination
Beginning on the date that is 2 years after the date of the establishment under paragraph (1), the Working Group may be terminated upon the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce jointly—
(A) determining that termination of the Working Group is appropriate; and
(B) submitting to the appropriate congressional committees a notification of such determination (including a description of the justification for such determination).
(6) Reports
(A) Submission to Congress
Not later than 60 days after December 23, 2022, and biannually thereafter until the date of termination under paragraph (5), the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the activities of the Working Group.
(B) Matters
Each report under subparagraph (A) shall include a description of the following:
(i) Any current or future foreign commercial threats identified by the Working Group.
(ii) The strategy of the United States Government, if any, to mitigate any current foreign commercial threats or future foreign commercial threats so identified.
(iii) The plan of the intelligence community to provide to the Department of Commerce and other nontraditional customers of the intelligence community support in addressing foreign commercial threats.
(iv) Any other significant activity of the Working Group.
(c) Option to discharge obligation through other means
If the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce make a joint determination that the requirements of the Working Group under subsection (b) (including the duties under paragraph (3) and the reporting requirement under paragraph (6) of such subsection) may be appropriately filled by an existing entity or structure, and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notification of such determination (including a description of the justification for such determination), the Director and Secretary may task such entity or structure with such requirements in lieu of establishing the Working Group.
(
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definitions of "intelligence community" and "congressional intelligence committees" as used in this section, see section 6002 of
§3371. Required counterintelligence assessments, briefings, notifications, and reports
(a) Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to Federal election campaigns
(1) Reports required
(A) In general
As provided in subparagraph (B), with respect to an election for Federal office, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an internet website an advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to campaigns of candidates for Federal office. Each such report, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, shall include the following:
(i) A description of foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to campaigns of candidates for Federal office.
(ii) A summary of best practices that campaigns of candidates for Federal office can employ in seeking to counter such threats.
(iii) An identification of publicly available resources, including United States Government resources, for countering such threats.
(B) Schedule for submittal
(i) In general
Except as provided by clause (ii), with respect to an election for Federal office, a report under this subsection shall be first made available not later than the date that is 1 year before the date of such election, and may be subsequently revised as the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.
(ii) 2020 elections
With respect to an election for Federal office that occurs during 2020, the report under this subsection shall be first made available not later than the date that is 60 days after December 20, 2020, and may be subsequently revised as the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.
(C) Information to be included
A report under this subsection shall reflect the most current information available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.
(2) Treatment of campaigns subject to heightened threats
If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis jointly determine that a campaign of a candidate for Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, may make available additional information to the appropriate representatives of such campaign.
(b) Omitted
(c) Director of National Intelligence assessment of foreign interference in Federal elections
(1) Assessments required
Not later than 45 days after the end of a Federal election cycle, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of such other executive departments and agencies as the Director considers appropriate, shall—
(A) conduct an assessment of any information indicating that a foreign government, or any person acting as an agent of or on behalf of a foreign government, has acted with the intent or purpose of interfering in elections for Federal office occurring during the Federal election cycle; and
(B) transmit the findings of the Director with respect to the assessment conducted under subparagraph (A), along with such supporting information as the Director considers appropriate, to the following:
(i) The President.
(ii) The Secretary of State.
(iii) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(iv) The Secretary of Defense.
(v) The Attorney General.
(vi) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
(vii) Congress.
(2) Elements
An assessment conducted under paragraph (1)(A), with respect to an act described in such paragraph, shall identify, to the maximum extent ascertainable, the following:
(A) The nature of any foreign interference and any methods employed to execute the act.
(B) The persons involved.
(C) The foreign government or governments that authorized, directed, sponsored, or supported the act.
(3) Publication
The Director shall, not later than 60 days after the end of a Federal election cycle, make available to the public, to the greatest extent possible consistent with the protection of sources and methods, the findings transmitted under paragraph (1)(B).
(4) Federal election cycle defined
In this section, the term "Federal election cycle" means the period which begins on the day after the date of a regularly scheduled general election for Federal office and which ends on the date of the first regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held after such date.
(5) Effective date
This subsection shall apply with respect to the Federal election cycle that began during November 2018, and each succeeding Federal election cycle.
(
Editorial Notes
Codification
Section is comprised of section 5304 of
§3371a. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal elections
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership
The term "congressional leadership" includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(3) Security vulnerability
The term "security vulnerability" has the meaning given such term in
(b) In general
The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall—
(1) commence not later than 1 year before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, and complete not later than 180 days before such election, an assessment of security vulnerabilities of State election systems; and
(2) not later than 180 days before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, submit a report on such security vulnerabilities and an assessment of foreign intelligence threats to the election to—
(A) congressional leadership; and
(B) the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Update
Not later than 90 days before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(1) update the assessment of foreign intelligence threats to that election; and
(2) submit the updated assessment to—
(A) congressional leadership; and
(B) the appropriate congressional committees.
(
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (a)(3).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definitions of "congressional intelligence committees" and "intelligence community", referred to in text, see section 5003 of div. E of
§3371b. Information sharing with State election officials
(a) State defined
In this section, the term "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.
(b) Security clearances
(1) In general
Not later than 30 days after December 20, 2019, the Director of National Intelligence shall support the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and any other official of the Department of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in sponsoring a security clearance up to the top secret level for each eligible chief election official of a State or the District of Columbia, and additional eligible designees of such election official as appropriate, at the time that such election official assumes such position.
(2) Interim clearances
Consistent with applicable policies and directives, the Director of National Intelligence may issue interim clearances, for a period to be determined by the Director, to a chief election official as described in paragraph (1) and up to one designee of such official under such paragraph.
(c) Information sharing
(1) In general
The Director of National Intelligence shall assist the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Under Secretary responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department (as specified in
(2) Coordination
The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department (as specified in
(
§3371c. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns directed at elections for Federal offices
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Active measures campaign
The term "active measures campaign" means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence operation.
(2) Candidate, election, and political party
The terms "candidate", "election", and "political party" have the meanings given those terms in
(3) Congressional leadership
The term "congressional leadership" includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(4) Cyber intrusion
The term "cyber intrusion" means an electronic occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority, electronic election infrastructure, or the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information within such infrastructure.
(5) Electronic election infrastructure
The term "electronic election infrastructure" means an electronic information system of any of the following that is related to an election for Federal office:
(A) The Federal Government.
(B) A State or local government.
(C) A political party.
(D) The election campaign of a candidate.
(6) Federal office
The term "Federal office" has the meaning given that term in
(7) High confidence
The term "high confidence", with respect to a determination, means that the determination is based on high-quality information from multiple sources.
(8) Moderate confidence
The term "moderate confidence", with respect to a determination, means that a determination is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.
(9) Other appropriate congressional committees
The term "other appropriate congressional committees" means—
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Determinations of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns
The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly carry out subsection (c) if such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine—
(1) that on or after December 20, 2019, a significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended to influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has occurred or is occurring; and
(2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity.
(c) Briefing
(1) In general
Not later than 14 days after making a determination under subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership, the congressional intelligence committees and, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, the other appropriate congressional committees. The briefing shall be classified and address, at a minimum, the following:
(A) A description of the significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be, covered by the determination.
(B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such intrusion or campaign has been attributed.
(C) The desirability and feasibility of the public release of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures campaign.
(D) Any other information such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine appropriate.
(2) Electronic election infrastructure briefings
With respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a determination under subsection (b), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be classified and made available only to individuals with appropriate security clearances.
(3) Protection of sources and methods
This subsection shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the protection of sources and methods.
(
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definition of "congressional intelligence committees", referred to in subsec. (c)(1), see section 5003 of div. E of
§3371d. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead election security matters
(a) In general
The Director of National Intelligence shall designate a national counterintelligence officer within the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating to election security.
(b) Additional responsibilities
The person designated under subsection (a) shall also lead, manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating to risks posed by interference from foreign powers (as defined in
(1) The Federal Government election security supply chain.
(2) Election voting systems and software.
(3) Voter registration databases.
(4) Critical infrastructure related to elections.
(5) Such other Government goods and services as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
(
§3372. Monitoring mineral investments under Belt and Road Initiative of People's Republic of China
(a) Report required
Not later than 1 year after December 27, 2020, the Director of National Intelligence (referred to in this section as the "Director"), in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the United States Trade Representative, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on investments in minerals under the Belt and Road Initiative of the People's Republic of China that includes an assessment of—
(1) notable past mineral investments;
(2) whether and how such investments have increased the extent of control of minerals by the People's Republic of China;
(3) any efforts by the People's Republic of China to counter or interfere with the goals of the Energy Resource Governance Initiative of the Department of State; and
(4) the strategy of the People's Republic of China with respect to mineral investments.
(b) Monitoring mechanism
In conjunction with each report required by subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of any minerals with respect to which—
(1) the People's Republic of China, directly or through the Belt and Road Initiative—
(A) is increasing its concentration of extraction and processing;
(B) is acquiring significant mining and processing facilities;
(C) is maintaining or increasing export restrictions; or
(D) has achieved substantial control of the supply of minerals used within an industry or related minerals;
(2) there is a significant difference between domestic prices in the People's Republic of China as compared to prices on international markets; or
(3) there is a significant increase or volatility in price as a result of the Belt and Road Initiative of the People's Republic of China.
(c) Critical mineral evaluation
For any mineral included on the list required by subsection (b) that is not already designated as critical by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to
(1) determine, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the United States Trade Representative, whether the mineral is strategic and critical to the defense or national security of the United States; and
(2) make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Interior regarding the designation of the mineral under
(d) Annual updates
The Director shall update the report required by subsection (a) and list required by subsection (b) not less frequently than annually.
(e) Form
Each report or list required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
(f) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
(1) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(
§3373. Establishment of All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office
(a) Establishment of Office
(1) In general
Not later than 120 days after December 23, 2022, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish an office within a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or within a joint organization of the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to carry out the duties of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, as in effect on December 26, 2021, and such other duties as are required by this section, including those pertaining to unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(2) Designation
The office established under paragraph (1) shall be known as the "All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office" (in this section referred to as the "Office").
(b) Director and Deputy Director of the Office
(1) Appointment of Director
The head of the Office shall be the Director of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (in this section referred to as the "Director of the Office"), who shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Appointment of Deputy Director
The Deputy Director of the Office shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence in coordination with the Secretary of Defense.
(3) Reporting
(A) In general
The Director of the Office shall report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(B) Administrative and operational and security matters
The Director of the Office shall report—
(i) to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security on all administrative matters of the Office; and
(ii) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence on all operational and security matters of the Office.
(c) Duties
The duties of the Office shall include the following:
(1) Developing procedures to synchronize and standardize the collection, reporting, and analysis of incidents, including adverse physiological effects, regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena across the Department of Defense and the intelligence community, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, which shall be provided to the congressional defense committees, the congressional intelligence committees, and congressional leadership.
(2) Developing processes and procedures to ensure that such incidents from each component of the Department and each element of the intelligence community are reported and stored in an appropriate manner that allows for the integration of analysis of such information.
(3) Establishing procedures to require the timely and consistent reporting of such incidents.
(4) Evaluating links between unidentified anomalous phenomena and adversarial foreign governments, other foreign governments, or nonstate actors.
(5) Evaluating the threat that such incidents present to the United States.
(6) Coordinating with other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, as appropriate, including the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Energy.
(7) As appropriate, and in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence, consulting with allies and partners of the United States to better assess the nature and extent of unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(8) Preparing reports for Congress, in both classified and unclassified form, including under subsection (j).
(d) Response to and field investigations of unidentified anomalous phenomena
(1) Designation
The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly designate from within their respective organizations an official, to be under the direction of the Director of the Office, responsible for ensuring the appropriate expertise, authorities, accesses, data, systems, platforms, and capabilities are available for the rapid response to, and support for, the conduct of field investigations of incidents involving unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(2) Ability to respond
The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall ensure field investigations are supported by personnel with the requisite expertise, equipment, transportation, and other resources necessary to respond rapidly to incidents or patterns of observations involving unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(e) Scientific, technological, and operational analyses of data on unidentified anomalous phenomena
(1) Designation
The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall designate one or more line organizations that will be primarily responsible for scientific, technical, and operational analysis of data gathered by field investigations conducted pursuant to subsection (d) and data from other sources, including with respect to the testing of materials, medical studies, and development of theoretical models, to better understand and explain unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(2) Authority
The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall each issue such directives as are necessary to ensure that each line organization designated under paragraph (1) has authority to draw on the special expertise of persons outside the Federal Government with appropriate security clearances.
(f) Data; intelligence collection
(1) Availability of data and reporting on unidentified anomalous phenomena
(A) Availability of data
The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall ensure that each element of the intelligence community with data relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena makes such data available immediately to the Office.
(B) Reporting
The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall each, in coordination with one another, ensure that military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense or an element of the intelligence community, and contractor personnel of the Department or such an element, have access to procedures by which the personnel shall report incidents or information, including adverse physiological effects, involving or associated with unidentified anomalous phenomena directly to the Office.
(2) Intelligence collection and analysis plan
The Director of the Office, acting in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall supervise the development and execution of an intelligence collection and analysis plan to gain as much knowledge as possible regarding the technical and operational characteristics, origins, and intentions of unidentified anomalous phenomena, including with respect to the development, acquisition, deployment, and operation of technical collection capabilities necessary to detect, identify, and scientifically characterize unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(3) Use of resources and capabilities
In developing the plan under paragraph (2), the Director of the Office shall consider and propose, as appropriate, the use of any resource, capability, asset, or process of the Department and the intelligence community.
(g) Science plan
The Director of the Office, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall supervise the development and execution of a science plan to develop and test, as practicable, scientific theories to—
(1) account for characteristics and performance of unidentified anomalous phenomena that exceed the known state of the art in science or technology, including in the areas of propulsion, aerodynamic control, signatures, structures, materials, sensors, countermeasures, weapons, electronics, and power generation; and
(2) provide the foundation for potential future investments to replicate or otherwise better understand any such advanced characteristics and performance.
(h) Assignment of priority
The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with and with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, shall assign an appropriate level of priority within the National Intelligence Priorities Framework to the requirement to understand, characterize, and respond to unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(i) Detailees from elements of the intelligence community
The heads of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Department of Energy, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, and such other elements of the intelligence community as the Director of the Office considers appropriate may provide to the Office a detailee of the element to be physically located at the Office.
(j) Historical record report
(1) Report required
(A) In general
Not later than 540 days after December 23, 2022, the Director of the Office shall submit to the congressional defense committees, the congressional intelligence committees, and congressional leadership a written report detailing the historical record of the United States Government relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena, including—
(i) the records and documents of the intelligence community;
(ii) oral history interviews;
(iii) open source analysis;
(iv) interviews of current and former Government officials;
(v) classified and unclassified national archives including any records any third party obtained pursuant to
(vi) such other relevant historical sources as the Director of the Office considers appropriate.
(B) Other requirements
The report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall—
(i) focus on the period beginning on January 1, 1945, and ending on the date on which the Director of the Office completes activities under this subsection; and
(ii) include a compilation and itemization of the key historical record of the involvement of the intelligence community with unidentified anomalous phenomena, including—
(I) any program or activity that was protected by restricted access that has not been explicitly and clearly reported to Congress;
(II) successful or unsuccessful efforts to identify and track unidentified anomalous phenomena; and
(III) any efforts to obfuscate, manipulate public opinion, hide, or otherwise provide incorrect unclassified or classified information about unidentified anomalous phenomena or related activities.
(2) Access to records of the National Archives and Records Administration
The Archivist of the United States shall make available to the Office such information maintained by the National Archives and Records Administration, including classified information, as the Director of the Office considers necessary to carry out paragraph (1).
(k) Annual reports
(1) Reports from All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office
(A) Requirement
Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, and annually thereafter for four years, the Director of the Office shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(B) Elements
Each report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to the year covered by the report, the following information:
(i) All reported unidentified anomalous phenomena-related events that occurred during the one-year period.
(ii) All reported unidentified anomalous phenomena-related events that occurred during a period other than that one-year period but were not included in an earlier report.
(iii) An analysis of data and intelligence received through each reported unidentified anomalous phenomena-related event.
(iv) An analysis of data relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena collected through—
(I) geospatial intelligence;
(II) signals intelligence;
(III) human intelligence; and
(IV) measurement and signature intelligence.
(v) The number of reported incidents of unidentified anomalous phenomena over restricted airspace of the United States during the one-year period.
(vi) An analysis of such incidents identified under clause (v).
(vii) Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by unidentified anomalous phenomena to the national security of the United States.
(viii) An assessment of any activity regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena that can be attributed to one or more adversarial foreign governments.
(ix) Identification of any incidents or patterns regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena that indicate a potential adversarial foreign government may have achieved a breakthrough aerospace capability.
(x) An update on the coordination by the United States with allies and partners on efforts to track, understand, and address unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(xi) An update on any efforts underway on the ability to capture or exploit discovered unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(xii) An assessment of any health-related effects for individuals that have encountered unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(xiii) The number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified anomalous phenomena associated with military nuclear assets, including strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships and submarines.
(xiv) In consultation with the Administrator for Nuclear Security, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified anomalous phenomena associated with facilities or assets associated with the production, transportation, or storage of nuclear weapons or components thereof.
(xv) In consultation with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified anomalous phenomena or drones of unknown origin associated with nuclear power generating stations, nuclear fuel storage sites, or other sites or facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(xvi) The names of the line organizations that have been designated to perform the specific functions under subsections (d) and (e), and the specific functions for which each such line organization has been assigned primary responsibility.
(xvii) A summary of the reports received using the mechanism for authorized reporting established under
(2) Form
Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(l) Semiannual briefings
(1) Requirement
Not later than December 31, 2022, and not less frequently than semiannually thereafter until December 31, 2026, the Director of the Office shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees classified briefings on unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(2) First briefing
The first briefing provided under paragraph (1) shall include all incidents involving unidentified anomalous phenomena that were reported to the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force or to the Office established under subsection (a) after June 24, 2021, regardless of the date of occurrence of the incident.
(3) Subsequent briefings
Each briefing provided subsequent to the first briefing described in paragraph (2) shall include, at a minimum, all events relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena that occurred during the previous 180 days, and events relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena that were not included in an earlier briefing.
(4) Instances in which data was not shared
For each briefing period, the Director of the Office shall jointly provide to the chairman or chair and the ranking member or vice chairman of the congressional committees specified in subparagraphs (A) and (D) of subsection (n)(1) an enumeration of any instances in which data relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena was not provided to the Office because of classification restrictions on that data or for any other reason.
(m) Task Force termination
Not later than the date on which the Secretary of Defense establishes the Office under subsection (a), the Secretary shall terminate the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force.
(n) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term "appropriate congressional committees" means the following:
(A) The Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(B) The Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(C) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(D) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(E) The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(F) The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives.
(2) Congressional defense committees
The term "congressional defense committees" has the meaning given such term in
(3) Congressional intelligence committees
The term "congressional intelligence committees" has the meaning given such term in
(4) Congressional leadership
The term "congressional leadership" means—
(A) the majority leader of the Senate;
(B) the minority leader of the Senate;
(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(5) Intelligence community
The term "intelligence community" has the meaning given such term in
(6) Line organization
The term "line organization" means, with respect to a department or agency of the Federal Government, an organization that executes programs and activities to directly advance the core functions and missions of the department or agency to which the organization is subordinate, but, with respect to the Department of Defense, does not include a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
(7) Transmedium objects or devices
The term "transmedium objects or devices" means objects or devices that are—
(A) observed to transition between space and the atmosphere, or between the atmosphere and bodies of water; and
(B) not immediately identifiable.
(8) Unidentified anomalous phenomena
The term "unidentified anomalous phenomena" means—
(A) airborne objects that are not immediately identifiable;
(B) transmedium objects or devices; and
(C) submerged objects or devices that are not immediately identifiable and that display behavior or performance characteristics suggesting that the objects or devices may be related to the objects described in subparagraph (A).
(
Editorial Notes
Amendments
2023—Subsec. (k)(1).
Subsec. (k)(1)(A).
2022—
Subsec. (h)(1).
Subsec. (h)(2)(Q).
Subsec. (l)(2) to (6).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Limitation Regarding Independent Research and Development
"(b)
"(c)
"(1) The term 'appropriate congressional committees' means—
"(A) the congressional defense committees [Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives]; and
"(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
"(2) The term 'congressional leadership' means—
"(A) the majority leader of the Senate;
"(B) the minority leader of the Senate;
"(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
"(D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
"(3) The term 'unidentified anomalous phenomena' has the meaning given such term in section 1683(n) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (
Comptroller General of the United States Audits and Briefings on Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena Historical Record Report
"(a)
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
"(c)
"(d)
[For definition of "congressional intelligence committees" as used in section 6803 of
§3373a. Support for and oversight of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force
(a) Availability of data on unidentified aerial phenomena
The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly require that each element of the intelligence community and component of the Department of Defense with data relating to unidentified aerial phenomena makes 1 such data available immediately to the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, or successor entity, and to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center.
(b) Quarterly reports
(1) In general
Not later than 90 days after March 15, 2022, and not less frequently than quarterly thereafter, the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, or successor entity, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the findings of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, or successor entity.
(2) Contents
Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(A) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during the period covered by the report.
(B) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during a period other than the period covered by the report but were not included in an earlier report.
(3) Form
Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.
(c) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term "appropriate congressional committees" means the following:
(A) The congressional intelligence committees.
(B) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
(2) Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force
The term "Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force" means the task force established by the Department of Defense on August 4, 2020, to be led by the Department of the Navy, under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.
(
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definitions of "congressional intelligence committees" and "intelligence community", referred to in text, see section 2 of div. X of
1 So in original. Probably should be "make".
§3373b. Unidentified anomalous phenomena reporting procedures
(a) Mechanism for authorized reporting
(1) Establishment
The Secretary of Defense, acting through the head of the Office and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish a secure mechanism for authorized reporting of—
(A) any event relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena; and
(B) any activity or program by a department or agency of the Federal Government or a contractor of such a department or agency relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena, including with respect to material retrieval, material analysis, reverse engineering, research and development, detection and tracking, developmental or operational testing, and security protections and enforcement.
(2) Protection of systems, programs, and activity
The Secretary shall ensure that the mechanism for authorized reporting established under paragraph (1) prevents the unauthorized public reporting or compromise of classified military and intelligence systems, programs, and related activity, including all categories and levels of special access and compartmented access programs.
(3) Administration
The Secretary shall ensure that the mechanism for authorized reporting established under paragraph (1) is administered by designated and appropriately cleared employees of the Department of Defense or elements of the intelligence community or contractors of the Department or such elements assigned to the Office.
(4) Sharing of information
(A) Prompt sharing within Office
The Secretary shall ensure that the mechanism for authorized reporting established under paragraph (1) provides for the sharing of an authorized disclosure to personnel and supporting analysts and scientists of the Office (regardless of the classification of information contained in the disclosure or any nondisclosure agreements), unless the employees or contractors administering the mechanism under paragraph (3) conclude that the preponderance of information available regarding the disclosure indicates that the observed object and associated events and activities likely relate to a special access program or compartmented access program that, as of the date of the disclosure, has been explicitly and clearly reported to the congressional defense committees or the congressional intelligence committees, and is documented as meeting those criteria.
(B) Congressional notification
Not later than 72 hours after determining that an authorized disclosure relates to a restricted access activity, a special access program, or a compartmented access program that has not been explicitly and clearly reported to the congressional defense committees or the congressional intelligence committees, the Secretary shall report such disclosure to such committees and the congressional leadership.
(5) Initial report and publication
Not later than 180 days after December 23, 2022, the Secretary, acting through the head of the Office and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall—
(A) submit to the congressional defense committees, the congressional intelligence committees, and the congressional leadership a report detailing the mechanism for authorized reporting established under paragraph (1); and
(B) issue clear public guidance for how to securely access the mechanism for authorized reporting.
(b) Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures
(1) Authorized disclosures
An authorized disclosure—
(A) shall not be subject to a nondisclosure agreement entered into by the individual who makes the disclosure;
(B) shall be deemed to comply with any regulation or order issued under the authority of Executive Order 13526 (
(C) is not a violation of
(2) Prohibition on reprisals
(A) Protection
An employee of a department or agency of the Federal Government, or of a contractor, subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal services contractor of such a department or agency, who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority, take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action, including the revocation or suspension of security clearances, or termination of employment, with respect to any individual as a reprisal for any authorized disclosure.
(B) Procedures
The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall establish procedures for the enforcement of subparagraph (A) consistent with, as appropriate,
(3) Nondisclosure agreements
(A) Identification
The Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the heads of such other departments and agencies of the Federal Government that have supported investigations of the types of events covered by subparagraph (A) of subsection (a)(1) and activities and programs described in subparagraph (B) of such subsection, and contractors of the Federal Government that have supported or are supporting such activities and programs, shall conduct comprehensive searches of all records relating to nondisclosure orders relating to the types of events described in subsection (a) and provide copies of such orders, agreements, or obligations to the Office.
(B) Submission to Congress
The head of the Office shall—
(i) make the records compiled under subparagraph (A) accessible to the congressional defense committees, the congressional intelligence committees, and the congressional leadership; and
(ii) not later than September 30, 2023, and at least once each fiscal year thereafter through fiscal year 2026, provide to such committees and congressional leadership briefings and reports on such records.
(c) Omitted
(d) Definitions
In this section:
(1) The term "authorized disclosure" means a report of any information through, and in compliance with, the mechanism for authorized reporting established pursuant to subsection (a)(1).
(2) The term "congressional intelligence committees" has the meaning given such term in
(3) The term "congressional leadership" means—
(A) the majority leader of the Senate;
(B) the minority leader of the Senate;
(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(4) The term "intelligence community" has the meaning given such term in
(5) The term "nondisclosure agreement" means any written or oral nondisclosure agreement, order, or other instrumentality or means entered into by an individual that could be interpreted as a legal constraint on the individual making an authorized disclosure.
(6) The term "Office" means the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office established pursuant to
(7) The term "personnel action" has the meaning given such term in
(8) The term "unidentified anomalous phenomena" has the meaning given such term in
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Executive Order 13526, referred to in subsec. (b)(1)(B), is Ex. Ord. No. 13526, Dec. 29, 2009, 75 F.R. 707, 1013, which is set out as a note under
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, referred to in subsec. (b)(1)(B), is act Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, as added by act Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, §1,
Codification
Section is comprised of section 1673 of
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Definitions
For definition of "congressional defense committees" as the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, see