§8701. Definitions
Except as otherwise specifically provided, in this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term "appropriate congressional committees" has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (
(2) Financial transaction
The term "financial transaction" means any transfer of value involving a financial institution, including the transfer of forwards, futures, options, swaps, or precious metals, including gold, silver, platinum, and palladium.
(3) Knowingly
The term "knowingly" has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (
(4) United States person
The term "United States person" has the meaning given that term in section 8511 of this title.
(
Editorial Notes
References in Text
This Act, referred to in text, is
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Short Title
Monitoring Iranian Enrichment of Uranium-235
"(a)
"(1) any enrichment of any amount of uranium-235 to a purity percentage that is 5 percent higher than the purity percentage indicated in the prior submission to Congress under subsection (b)(1); or
"(2) any enrichment of uranium-235 in a quantity exceeding 10 kilograms.
"(b)
"(1)
"(2)
[For definition of "intelligence community" as used in section 7413 of
Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) an Islamic Republic of Iran that possesses a nuclear weapons capability would be a serious threat to the national security of the United States, Israel, and other allies and partners;
"(2) the Islamic Republic of Iran has been less than cooperative with international inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency and has obstructed their ability to inspect facilities as well as data and recordings collected by surveillance equipment across Iran;
"(3) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to advance missile and drone programs, which are a threat to the national security of the United States, Israel, and other allies and partners;
"(4) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to support proxies in the Middle East in a manner that-
"(A) undermines the sovereignty of regional governments;
"(B) threatens the safety of United States citizens;
"(C) threatens United States allies and partners; and
"(D) directly undermines the national security interests of the United States;
"(5) the Islamic Republic of Iran has engaged in assassination plots against former United States officials and has been implicated in plots to kidnap United States citizens within the United States;
"(6) the Islamic Republic of Iran is engaged in unsafe and unprofessional maritime activity that threatens the movement of naval vessels of the United States and the free flow of commerce through strategic maritime chokepoints in the Middle East and North Africa;
"(7) the Islamic Republic of Iran has delivered hundreds of armed drones to the Russian Federation, which will enable Vladimir Putin to continue the assault against Ukraine in direct opposition of the national security interests of the United States; and
"(8) the United States must-
"(A) ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapons capability;
"(B) protect against aggression from the Islamic Republic of Iran manifested through its missiles and drone programs; and
"(C) counter regional and global terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner that minimizes the threat posed by state and non-state actors to the interests of the United States.
"(c)
"(1)
"(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
"(3)
"(4)
"(5)
"(d)
"(1)
"(A) nuclear activity of the Islamic Republic of Iran or its proxies; and
"(B) regional and global terrorism activity by the Islamic Republic of Iran or its proxies.
"(2)
"(A)
"(B)
"(i)
"(I) The Department of State.
"(II) The Department of Defense.
"(III) The Department of Energy.
"(ii)
"(iii)
"(3)
"(e)
"(1)
"(A)
"(B)
"(i) a description and location of current fuel cycle activities for the production of fissile material being undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including-
"(I) research and development activities to procure or construct additional advanced IR-2, IR-6 and other model centrifuges and enrichment cascades, including for stable isotopes;
"(II) research and development of reprocessing capabilities, including-
"(aa) reprocessing of spent fuel; and
"(bb) extraction of medical isotopes from irradiated uranium targets;
"(III) activities with respect to designing or constructing reactors, including-
"(aa) the construction of heavy water reactors;
"(bb) the manufacture or procurement of reactor components, including the intended application of such components; and
"(cc) efforts to rebuild the original reactor at Arak;
"(IV) uranium mining, concentration, conversion, and fuel fabrication, including-
"(aa) estimated uranium ore production capacity and annual recovery;
"(bb) recovery processes and ore concentrate production capacity and annual recovery;
"(cc) research and development with respect to, and the annual rate of, conversion of uranium; and
"(dd) research and development with respect to the fabrication of reactor fuels, including the use of depleted, natural, and enriched uranium; and
"(V) activities with respect to-
"(aa) producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium (or their alloys);
"(bb) conducting research and development on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys);
"(cc) uranium metal; or
"(dd) casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium;
"(ii) with respect to any activity described in clause (i), a description, as applicable, of-
"(I) the number and type of centrifuges used to enrich uranium and the operating status of such centrifuges;
"(II) the number and location of any enrichment or associated research and development facility used to engage in such activity;
"(III) the amount of heavy water, in metric tons, produced by such activity and the acquisition or manufacture of major reactor components, including, for the second and subsequent assessments, the amount produced since the last assessment;
"(IV) the number and type of fuel assemblies produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including failed or rejected assemblies; and
"(V) the total amount of-
"(aa) uranium–235 enriched to not greater than 5 percent purity;
"(bb) uranium–235 enriched to greater than 5 percent purity and not greater than 20 percent purity;
"(cc) uranium–235 enriched to greater than 20 percent purity and not greater than 60 percent purity;
"(dd) uranium–235 enriched to greater than 60 percent purity and not greater than 90 percent purity; and
"(ee) uranium–235 enriched greater than 90 percent purity;
"(iii) a description of any weaponization plans and weapons development capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including-
"(I) plans and capabilities with respect to-
"(aa) weapon design, including fission, warhead miniaturization, and boosted and early thermonuclear weapon design;
"(bb) high yield fission development;
"(cc) design, development, acquisition, or use of computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices;
"(dd) design, development, fabricating, acquisition, or use of explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources; and
"(ee) design, development, fabrication, acquisition, or use of precision machining and tooling that could enable the production of nuclear explosive device components;
"(II) the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to deploy a working or reliable delivery vehicle capable of carrying a nuclear warhead;
"(III) the estimated breakout time for the Islamic Republic of Iran to develop and deploy a nuclear weapon, including a crude nuclear weapon; and
"(IV) the status and location of any research and development work site related to the preparation of an underground nuclear test;
"(iv) an identification of any clandestine nuclear facilities;
"(v) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains locations to store equipment, research archives, or other material previously used for a weapons program or that would be of use to a weapons program that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency;
"(vi) any diversion by the Islamic Republic of Iran of uranium, carbon-fiber, or other materials for use in an undeclared or clandestine facility;
"(vii) an assessment of activities related to developing or acquiring the capabilities for the production of nuclear weapons, conducted at facilities controlled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, including an analysis of gaps in knowledge;
"(viii) a description of activities between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries or persons with respect to sharing information on, or providing other forms of support for, the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability or activities related to weaponization;
"(ix) with respect to any new ballistic, cruise, or hypersonic missiles being designed and tested by the Islamic Republic of Iran or any of its proxies, a description of-
"(I) the type of missile;
"(II) the range of such missiles;
"(III) the capability of such missiles to deliver a nuclear warhead;
"(IV) the number of such missiles; and
"(V) any testing of such missiles;
"(x) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran or any of its proxies possesses an unmanned aircraft system or other military equipment capable of delivering a nuclear weapon; and
"(xi) an assessment of the extent to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is providing drones, missiles, or related technology from other countries to its proxies or partners.
"(2)
"(A)
"(B)
"(i) a description of the lethal support of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including training, equipment, and associated intelligence support, to regional and global non-state terrorist groups and proxies;
"(ii) a description of the lethal support of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including training and equipment, to state actors;
"(iii) an assessment of financial support of the Islamic Republic of Iran to non-state terrorist groups and proxies and associated Iranian revenue streams funding such support;
"(iv) an assessment of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iranian-supported groups to members of the Armed Forces, diplomats, and military and diplomatic facilities of the United States;
"(v) a description of attacks by, or sponsored by, the Islamic Republic of Iran against members of the Armed Forces, diplomats, and military and diplomatic facilities of the United States and the associated response by the United States Government in the previous year;
"(vi) a description of attacks by, or sponsored by, the Islamic Republic of Iran against United States partners or allies and the associated response by the United States Government in the previous year;
"(vii) an assessment of interference by the Islamic Republic of Iran into the elections and political processes of sovereign countries in the Middle East and North Africa in an effort to create conditions for or shape agendas more favorable to the policies of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
"(viii) a description of any plots by the Islamic Republic of Iran against former and current United States officials;
"(ix) a description of any plots by the Islamic Republic of Iran against United States citizens both abroad and within the United States; and
"(x) a description of maritime activity of the Islamic Republic of Iran and associated impacts on the free flow of commerce and the national security interests of the United States.
"(3)
"(A)
"(B)
"(C)
"(f)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran-
"(i) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement as well as the nuclear related commitments endorsed in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015); and
"(ii) has denied access to sites that the International Atomic Energy Agency has sought to inspect during previous 1-year period;
"(B) a description of any dual-use item (as defined under section 730.3 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations or listed on the List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology issued by the Nuclear Suppliers Group or any successor list) the Islamic Republic of Iran is using to further the nuclear weapon, missile, or drone program;
"(C) a description of efforts of the United States to counter efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran to project political and military influence into the Middle East;
"(D) a description of efforts to address the increased threat that new or evolving uranium enrichment, nuclear weaponization, missile, or drone development activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran pose to United States citizens, the diplomatic presence of the United States in the Middle East, and the national security interests of the United States;
"(E) a description of efforts to address the threat that terrorism by, or sponsored by, the Islamic Republic of Iran poses to United States citizens, the diplomatic presence of the United States in the Middle East, and the national security interests of the United States;
"(F) a description of efforts to address the impact of the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran on sovereign governments on the safety and security of United States citizens, the diplomatic presence of the United States in the Middle East, and the national security interests of the United States;
"(G) a description of a coordinated whole-of-government approach to use political, economic, and security related tools to address such activities; and
"(H) a comprehensive plan for engaging with allies and regional partners in all relevant multilateral fora to address such activities.
"(3)
Report on Use by Iran of Funds Made Available Through Sanctions Relief
"(a)
"(1) The monetary value of any direct or indirect forms of sanctions relief that Iran has received since the Joint Plan of Action first entered into effect.
"(2) How Iran has used funds made available through sanctions relief, including the extent to which any such funds have facilitated the ability of Iran-
"(A) to provide support for-
"(i) any individual or entity designated for the imposition of sanctions for activities relating to international terrorism pursuant to an executive order or by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury as of the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 18, 2015];
"(ii) any organization designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) as of the date of the enactment of this Act;
"(iii) any other terrorist organization; or
"(iv) the regime of Bashar al Assad in Syria;
"(B) to advance the efforts of Iran or any other country to develop nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles overtly or covertly; or
"(C) to commit any violation of the human rights of the people of Iran.
"(3) The extent to which any senior official of the Government of Iran has diverted any funds made available through sanctions relief to be used by the official for personal use.
"(b)
"(1)
"(A) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 18, 2015] and every 180 days thereafter during the period that the Joint Plan of Action is in effect; and
"(B) not later than 1 year after a subsequent agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran takes effect and annually thereafter during the period that such agreement remains in effect.
"(2)
"(A) the Director notifies the appropriate congressional committees of the intention of making such submission before submitting that report; and
"(B) all matters required to be covered by subsection (a) are included in that report.
"(c)
"(d)
"(1)
"(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
"(B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
"(2)
Reports on Nuclear Program of Iran
"(a)
"(1) verification of whether Iran is complying with such agreement; and
"(2) an assessment of the overall state of the nuclear program of Iran.
"(b)
"(c)
"(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
"(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
"(d)
Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere
"SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
"This Act may be cited as the 'Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012'.
"SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
"Congress finds the following:
"(1) The United States has vital political, economic, and security interests in the Western Hemisphere.
"(2) Iran is pursuing cooperation with Latin American countries by signing economic and security agreements in order to create a network of diplomatic and economic relationships to lessen the blow of international sanctions and oppose Western attempts to constrict its ambitions.
"(3) According to the Department of State, Hezbollah, with Iran as its state sponsor, is considered the 'most technically capable terrorist group in the world' with 'thousands of supporters, several thousand members, and a few hundred terrorist operatives,' and officials from the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force have been working in concert with Hezbollah for many years.
"(4) The IRGC's Qods Force has a long history of supporting Hezbollah's military, paramilitary, and terrorist activities, providing it with guidance, funding, weapons, intelligence, and logistical support, and in 2007, the Department of the Treasury placed sanctions on the IRGC and its Qods Force for their support of terrorism and proliferation activities.
"(5) The IRGC's Qods Force stations operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and religious and cultural institutions to foster relationships, often building on existing socioeconomic ties with the well established Shia Diaspora, and recent years have witnessed an increased presence in Latin America.
"(6) According to the Department of Defense, the IRGC and its Qods Force played a significant role in some of the deadliest terrorist attacks of the past two decades, including the 1994 attack on the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, by generally directing or supporting the groups that actually executed the attacks.
"(7) Reports of Iranian intelligence agents being implicated in Hezbollah-linked activities since the early 1990s suggest direct Iranian government support of Hezbollah activities in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, and in the past decade, Iran has dramatically increased its diplomatic missions to Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina, and Brazil. Iran has built 17 cultural centers in Latin America, and it currently maintains 11 embassies, up from 6 in 2005.
"(8) Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies with a presence in Latin America have raised revenues through illicit activities, including drug and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, forging travel documents, pirating software and music, and providing haven and assistance to other terrorists transiting the region.
"(9) Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela expressed their intention to assist Iran in evading sanctions by signing a statement supporting Iran's nuclear activities and announcing at a 2010 joint press conference in Tehran their determination to 'continue and expand their economic ties to Iran' with confidence that 'Iran can give a crushing response to the threats and sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism'.
"(10) The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration concluded in 2008 that almost one-half of the foreign terrorist organizations in the world are linked to narcotics trade and trafficking, including Hezbollah and Hamas.
"(11) In October 2011, the United States charged two men, Manssor Arbabsiar, a United States citizen holding both Iranian and United States passports, and Gholam Shakuri, an Iran-based member of Iran's IRGC Qods Force, with conspiracy to murder a foreign official using explosives in an act of terrorism. Arbabsiar traveled to Mexico with the express intent to hire 'someone in the narcotics business' to carry out the assassination of the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in the United States. While in the end, he only engaged a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency informant posing as an associate of a drug trafficking cartel, Arbabsiar believed that he was working with a member of a Mexican drug trafficking organization and sought to send money to this individual in installments and not in a single transfer.
"(12) In February 2011, actions by the Department of the Treasury effectively shut down the Lebanese Canadian Bank. Subsequent actions by the United States Government in connection with the investigation into Lebanese Canadian Bank resulted in the indictment in December 2011 of Ayman Joumaa, an individual of Lebanese nationality, with citizenship in Lebanon and Colombia, and with ties to Hezbollah, for trafficking cocaine to the Los Zetas drug trafficking organization in Mexico City for sale in the United States and for laundering the proceeds.
"SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
"It shall be the policy of the United States to use a comprehensive government-wide strategy to counter Iran's growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere by working together with United States allies and partners in the region to mutually deter threats to United States interests by the Government of Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGC's Qods Force, and Hezbollah.
"SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
"In this Act:
"(1)
"(2)
"SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT OF A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS IRAN'S GROWING HOSTILE PRESENCE AND ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) a description of the presence, activities, and operations of Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may be present in the Western Hemisphere, including information about their leaders, objectives, and areas of influence and information on their financial networks, trafficking activities, and safe havens;
"(2) a description of the terrain, population, ports, foreign firms, airports, borders, media outlets, financial centers, foreign embassies, charities, religious and cultural centers, and income-generating activities in the Western Hemisphere utilized by Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may be present in the Western Hemisphere;
"(3) a description of the relationship of Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, and Hezbollah with transnational criminal organizations linked to Iran and other terrorist organizations in the Western Hemisphere, including information on financial networks and trafficking activities;
"(4) a description of the relationship of Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may be present in the Western Hemisphere with the governments in the Western Hemisphere, including military-to-military relations and diplomatic, economic, and security partnerships and agreements;
"(5) a description of the Federal law enforcement capabilities, military forces, State and local government institutions, and other critical elements, such as nongovernmental organizations, in the Western Hemisphere that may organize to counter the threat posed by Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may be present in the Western Hemisphere;
"(6) a description of activity by Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may be present at the United States borders with Mexico and Canada and at other international borders within the Western Hemisphere, including operations related to drug, human, and arms trafficking, human support networks, financial support, narco-tunneling, and technological advancements that incorporates-
"(A) with respect to the United States borders, in coordination with the Governments of Mexico and Canada and the Secretary of Homeland Security, a plan to address resources, technology, and infrastructure to create a secure United States border and strengthen the ability of the United States and its allies to prevent operatives from Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, or any other terrorist organization from entering the United States; and
"(B) within Latin American countries, a multiagency action plan, in coordination with United States allies and partners in the region, that includes the development of strong rule-of-law institutions to provide security in such countries and a counterterrorism and counter-radicalization plan to isolate Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may be present in the Western Hemisphere from their sources of financial support and counter their facilitation of terrorist activity; and
"(7) a plan-
"(A) to address any efforts by foreign persons, entities, and governments in the region to assist Iran in evading United States and international sanctions;
"(B) to protect United States interests and assets in the Western Hemisphere, including embassies, consulates, businesses, energy pipelines, and cultural organizations, including threats to United States allies;
"(C) to support United States efforts to designate persons and entities in the Western Hemisphere for proliferation activities and terrorist activities relating to Iran, including affiliates of the IRGC, its Qods Force, and Hezbollah, under applicable law including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; and
"(D) to address the vital national security interests of the United States in ensuring energy supplies from the Western Hemisphere that are free from the influence of any foreign government that would attempt to manipulate or disrupt global energy markets.
"(c)
"(d)
"SEC. 6. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
"It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should keep the relevant congressional committees continually informed on the hostile actions of Iran in the Western Hemisphere.
"SEC. 7. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit the rights or protections enjoyed by United States citizens under the United States Constitution or other Federal law, or to create additional authorities for the Federal Government that are contrary to the United States Constitution and United States law."