CHAPTER 602 —NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MATTERS
Editorial Notes
Codification
Chapter analysis added pursuant to operation of
SUBCHAPTER I—STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP AND WEAPONS PRODUCTION
Editorial Notes
Codification
Subchapter analysis added pursuant to operation of
Amendments
2025—
§6111. Stockpile stewardship program
(a)
(1) the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons, including weapons design, system integration, manufacturing, security, use control, reliability assessment, and certification; and
(2) that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of underground nuclear weapons testing.
(b)
(1) An increased level of effort for the construction of new facilities and the modernization of existing facilities with production and manufacturing capabilities that are necessary to support the deterrence of strategic attacks against the United States by maintaining and enhancing the performance, reliability, and security of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, including—
(A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; and
(B) production and manufacturing capabilities resident in the national security laboratories.
(2) Support for advanced computational capabilities to enhance the simulation and modeling capabilities of the United States with respect to the performance over time of nuclear weapons.
(3) Support for above-ground experimental programs, such as hydrotesting, high-energy lasers, inertial confinement fusion, plasma physics, and materials research.
(4) Support for the modernization of facilities and projects that contribute to the experimental capabilities of the United States that support the sustainment and modernization of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile and the capabilities required to assess nuclear weapons effects.
(5) Support for the use of, and experiments facilitated by, the advanced experimental facilities of the United States, including—
(A) the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
(B) the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory;
(C) the Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories; and
(D) the experimental facilities at the Nevada National Security Site.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 6111, act Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Consultation Requirement With Respect To Transfer to Private Entities of Plutonium or Plutonium Materials; Report
"(a)
"(1)
"(2)
"(b)
"(1) A notification of the transfer.
"(2) A report that includes—
"(A) a description of—
"(i) the plutonium and plutonium materials to be transferred that includes the—
"(I) amount;
"(II) type;
"(III) age;
"(IV) relative condition; and
"(V) current location;
"(ii) the private entity to which such plutonium and plutonium materials will be transferred; and
"(iii) the destination location to which such plutonium and plutonium materials will be transferred.
"(B) A summary of the purpose of the transfer.
"(C) An identification of any direct costs to the United States Government associated with the transfer.
"(3) Except as provided in subsection (c), a written certification, prepared in coordination with the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and the Secretary of Defense, that such transfer does not negatively impact the needs of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including such needs related to stockpile stewardship.
"(c)
"(d)
"(1) The term 'appropriate congressional committees' means—
"(A) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate;
"(B) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and
"(C) the Committee on [Energy and] Natural Resources of the Senate.
"(2) The term 'private entity' means any individual or organization other than—
"(A) a department or agency of the Federal Government; or
"(B) a contractor or subcontractor for management and operations, site cleanup, or site management activities at facilities owned by the Department of Energy."
Plan for Developing Exascale Computing and Incorporating Such Computing Into the Stockpile Stewardship Program
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) the development of a prototype exascale computer for the stockpile stewardship program; and
"(2) mitigating disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale computing.
"(c)
"(d)
"(1) address, in the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations reflected in each future-years nuclear security program submitted under section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (
"(A) developing exascale computing and incorporating such computing into the stockpile stewardship program; and
"(B) mitigating potential disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale computing; and
"(2) include in each such future-years nuclear security program a description of the costs of efforts to develop exascale computing borne by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Science of the Department of Energy, other Federal agencies, and private industry.
"(e)
"(f)
§6112. Portfolio management framework for National Nuclear Security Administration
(a)
(1) in consultation with the Nuclear Weapons Council established under section 179, develop and implement a portfolio management framework for the nuclear security enterprise that—
(A) defines the Administration's portfolio of nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure maintenance and modernization programs;
(B) establishes a portfolio governance structure, including portfolio-level selection criteria, prioritization criteria, and performance metrics;
(C) outlines the approach of the Administration to managing that portfolio; and
(D) incorporates the leading practices identified by the Comptroller General of the United States in the report titled "Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA Should Use Portfolio Management Leading Practices to Support Modernization Efforts" (GAO-21-398) and dated June 2021; and
(2) complete an integrated, comprehensive assessment of the portfolio management capabilities required to execute the weapons activities portfolio of the Administration.
(b)
(1) the progress of the Administrator in developing the framework described in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and completing the assessment required by paragraph (2) of that subsection; and
(2) the plans of the Administrator for implementing the recommendations of the Comptroller General in the report referred to in paragraph (1)(D) of that subsection.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, referred to in subsec. (a), is the date of enactment of
Prior Provisions
A prior section 6112, acts Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 3121 of
§6113. Stockpile stewardship criteria
(a)
(b)
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 6113 was renumbered
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
§6114. Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, management, and responsiveness plan
(a)
(b)
(2) The report required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c)
(1) With respect to stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, and stockpile responsiveness—
(A) the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number and age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each warhead type;
(B) for each five-year period occurring during the period beginning on the date of the report and ending on the date that is 20 years after the date of the report—
(i) the planned number of nuclear warheads (including active and inactive) for each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile; and
(ii) the past and projected future total lifecycle cost of each type of nuclear weapon;
(C) the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace warhead types;
(D) a description of the process by which the Administrator assesses the lifetimes, and requirements for life extension or replacement, of the nuclear and non-nuclear components of the warheads (including active and inactive warheads) in the nuclear weapons stockpile;
(E) a description of the process used in recertifying the safety, security, and reliability of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile;
(F) any concerns of the Administrator that would affect the ability of the Administrator to recertify the safety, security, or reliability of warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile (including active and inactive warheads);
(G) mechanisms to provide for the manufacture, maintenance, and modernization of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile, as needed;
(H) mechanisms to expedite the collection of information necessary for carrying out the stockpile management program required by section 6116, including information relating to the aging of materials and components, new manufacturing techniques, and the replacement or substitution of materials;
(I) mechanisms to ensure the appropriate assignment of roles and missions for each national security laboratory and nuclear weapons production facility, including mechanisms for allocation of workload, mechanisms to ensure the carrying out of appropriate modernization activities, and mechanisms to ensure the retention of skilled personnel;
(J) mechanisms to ensure that each national security laboratory has full and complete access to all weapons data to enable a rigorous peer-review process to support the annual assessment of the condition of the nuclear weapons stockpile required under section 6117;
(K) mechanisms for allocating funds for activities under the stockpile management program required by section 6116, including allocations of funds by weapon type and facility;
(L) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the program required under section 6116;
(M) the status, plans, activities, budgets, and schedules for carrying out the stockpile responsiveness program under section 6131;
(N) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the program required under section 6131; and
(O) as required, when assessing and developing prototype nuclear weapons of foreign countries, a report from the directors of the national security laboratories on the need and plan for such assessment and development that includes separate comments on the plan from the Secretary of Energy and the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) With respect to science-based tools—
(A) a description of the information needed to determine that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable;
(B) for each science-based tool used to collect information described in subparagraph (A), the relationship between such tool and such information and the effectiveness of such tool in providing such information based on the criteria developed pursuant to section 6113(a); and
(C) the criteria developed under section 6113(a) (including any updates to such criteria).
(3) An assessment of the stockpile stewardship program under section 6111(a) by the Administrator, in consultation with the directors of the national security laboratories, which shall set forth—
(A) an identification and description of—
(i) any key technical challenges to the stockpile stewardship program; and
(ii) the strategies to address such challenges without the use of nuclear testing;
(B) a strategy for using the science-based tools (including advanced simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of nuclear testing;
(C) an assessment of the science-based tools (including advanced simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory that exist at the time of the assessment compared with the science-based tools expected to exist during the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program; and
(D) an assessment of the core scientific and technical competencies required to achieve the objectives of the stockpile stewardship program and other weapons activities and weapons-related activities of the Administration, including—
(i) the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians, by discipline, required to maintain such competencies; and
(ii) a description of any shortage of such individuals that exists at the time of the assessment compared with any shortage expected to exist during the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program.
(4) With respect to the nuclear security infrastructure—
(A) a description of the construction, modernization, and refurbishment measures the Administrator determines necessary to meet the requirements prescribed in—
(i) the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in the most recent national security strategy report of the President under section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (
(ii) the most recent national defense strategy as of the date of the plan; and
(iii) the most recent Nuclear Posture Review as of the date of the plan;
(B) an explanation of the targeted needs addressed by the measures described under subparagraph (A);
(C) a schedule for implementing the measures described under subparagraph (A) during the 10-year period following the date of the plan;
(D) a summary of identified long-term infrastructure investments needed beyond such 10-year period;
(E) a statement of changes to, and progress toward achieving, the measures described under subparagraph (A) during the period covered by the report, compared to such changes and progress during the period covered by the preceding report;
(F) the estimated levels of annual funds the Administrator determines necessary to carry out the measures described under subparagraph (A), including a discussion of the criteria, evidence, and strategies on which such estimated levels of annual funds are based; and
(G)(i) a description of—
(I) the metrics (based on industry best practices) used by the Administrator to determine the infrastructure deferred maintenance and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and
(II) the percentage of replacement plant value being spent on maintenance and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and
(ii) an explanation of whether the annual spending on such needs complies with the recommendation of the National Research Council of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine that such spending be in an amount equal to four percent of the replacement plant value, and, if not, the reasons for such noncompliance and a plan for how the Administrator will ensure facilities of the nuclear security enterprise are being properly sustained.
(5) With respect to the nuclear test readiness of the United States—
(A) an estimate of the period of time that would be necessary for the Administrator to conduct an underground test of a nuclear weapon once directed by the President to conduct such a test;
(B) a description of the level of test readiness that the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines to be appropriate;
(C) a list and description of the workforce skills and capabilities that are essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada National Security Site;
(D) a list and description of the infrastructure and physical plants that are essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada National Security Site; and
(E) an assessment of the readiness status of the skills and capabilities described in subparagraph (C) and the infrastructure and physical plants described in subparagraph (D).
(6) A strategy for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile stewardship needs over a 20-year period that includes the following:
(A) An assessment of the baseline science issues necessary to understand plutonium aging under static and dynamic conditions under manufactured and nonmanufactured plutonium geometries.
(B) An assessment of scientific and testing instrumentation for plutonium at elemental and bulk conditions.
(C) An assessment of manufacturing and handling technology for plutonium and plutonium components.
(D) An assessment of computational models of plutonium performance under static and dynamic loading, including manufactured and nonmanufactured conditions.
(E) An identification of any capability gaps with respect to the assessments described in subparagraphs (A) through (D).
(F) An estimate of costs relating to the issues, instrumentation, technology, and models described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) over the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program under section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (
(G) An estimate of the cost of eliminating the capability gaps identified under subparagraph (E) over the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program.
(H) Such other items as the Administrator considers important for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile stewardship needs.
(7) A plan for the research and development, deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of the technologies employed within the nuclear security enterprise to address physical and cyber security threats during the five fiscal years following the date of the report, together with—
(A) for each site in the nuclear security enterprise, a description of the technologies deployed to address the physical and cybersecurity threats posed to that site;
(B) for each site and for the nuclear security enterprise, the methods used by the Administration to establish priorities among investments in physical and cybersecurity technologies; and
(C) a detailed description of how the funds identified for each program element specified pursuant to paragraph (1) in the budget for the Administration for each fiscal year during that five-fiscal-year period will help carry out that plan.
(8) An assessment of whether the programs described by the report can be executed with current and projected budgets and any associated risks.
(9) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the previous summary or 1 detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).
(d)
(A) An analysis of the plan, including—
(i) whether the plan supports the requirements of the national security strategy of the United States referred to in subsection (d)(4)(A)(i),2 the most recent the national defense strategy, and the most recent Nuclear Posture Review;
(ii) whether the modernization and refurbishment measures described under subparagraph (A) of subsection (d)(4) 2 and the schedule described under subparagraph (B) of such subsection 2 are adequate to support such requirements; and
(iii) whether the plan supports the stockpile responsiveness program under section 6131 in a manner that meets the objectives of such program and an identification of any improvements that may be made to the plan to better carry out such program.
(B) An analysis of whether the plan adequately addresses the requirements for infrastructure recapitalization of the facilities of the nuclear security enterprise.
(C) If the Nuclear Weapons Council determines that the plan does not adequately support modernization and refurbishment requirements under subparagraph (A) or the nuclear security enterprise facilities infrastructure recapitalization requirements under subparagraph (B), a risk assessment with respect to—
(i) supporting the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile; and
(ii) maintaining the long-term safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(2) Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Administrator submits the plan under subsection (b)(1), the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report detailing the assessment required under paragraph (1).
(e)
(1) The term "budget", with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the President under
(2) The term "future-years nuclear security program" means the program required by section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (
(3) The term "national defense strategy" means the review of the defense programs and policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 113(g).
(4) The term "nuclear security budget materials", with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials submitted to Congress by the Administrator in support of the budget for that fiscal year.
(5) The term "weapons activities" means each activity within the budget category of weapons activities in the budget of the Administration.
(6) The term "weapons-related activities" means each activity under the Department of Energy that involves nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons technology, or fissile or radioactive materials, including activities related to—
(A) nuclear nonproliferation;
(B) nuclear forensics;
(C) nuclear intelligence;
(D) nuclear safety; and
(E) nuclear incident response.
(Added and amended
Editorial Notes
References in Text
Subsection (d)(4)(A), referred to in subsec. (d)(1)(A)(i), (ii), was resdesignated subsec. (c)(4)(A) of this section by
Subsection (d)(4)(B), referred to in subsec. (d)(1)(A)(ii), was redesignated subpar. (C) of subsec. (c)(4) of this section by
Codification
Amendment by section 3121 of
Prior Provisions
A prior section 6114, act Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Amendments
2025—
Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (b)(2).
Subsec. (b)(3).
Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (c)(4)(A).
Subsec. (c)(4)(B) to (G).
Subsec. (d).
Subsecs. (e), (f).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Further Technical Amendments
"(1)
"(A) The amendment to section 4203 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act ([former] 50 U.S.C. 2523) made by section 3122 [probably should be "3121"] shall be executed with respect to
"(B) The amendment to section 4219 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act ([former] 50 U.S.C. 2358a [probably should be "2538a"]) made by section 3112 shall be executed with respect to
"(C) The amendment to section 4220(c) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act ([former] 50 U.S.C. 2538b) made by section 3113 shall be executed with respect to
"(D) The amendment to subtitle A of title XLII of the Atomic Energy Defense Act ([former] 50 U.S.C. 2521 et seq.) made by section 3113 shall be executed with respect to subchapter I of
"(E) The amendment to section 4510 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act ([former] 50 U.S.C. 2661) made by section 3114 shall be executed with respect to
"(F) The amendment to section 4601 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act ([former] 50 U.S.C. 2701) made by section 3115 shall be executed with respect to
"(G) The amendment to section 4713 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act ([former] 50 U.S.C. 2753) made by section 3116 shall be executed with respect to
"(H) The amendment to subtitle B of title XLVIII of the Atomic Energy Defense Act ([former] 50 U.S.C. 2791 et seq.) made by section 3117 shall be executed with respect to subchapter II of
Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear Weapons Complex, and Delivery Platforms and Sense of Congress on Follow-on Negotiations to START Treaty
"(a)
"(1)
"(A) enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States;
"(B) modernize the nuclear weapons complex; and
"(C) maintain the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.
"(2)
"(A) A description of the plan to enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States.
"(B) A description of the plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, including improving the safety of facilities, modernizing the infrastructure, and maintaining the key capabilities and competencies of the nuclear weapons workforce, including designers and technicians.
"(C) A description of the plan to maintain delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.
"(D) An estimate of budget requirements, including the costs associated with the plans outlined under subparagraphs (A) through (C), over a 10-year period.
"(b)
"(1) the President should maintain the stated position of the United States that the follow-on treaty to the START Treaty not include any limitations on the ballistic missile defense systems, space capabilities, or advanced conventional weapons systems of the United States;
"(2) the enhanced safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, and maintenance of the nuclear delivery systems are key to enabling further reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States; and
"(3) the President should submit budget requests for fiscal year 2011 and subsequent fiscal years for the programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy that are adequate to sustain the needed capabilities to support the long-term maintenance of the nuclear stockpile of the United States."
Executive Documents
Annual Update to the Report Specified in Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84 )
Memorandum of President of the United States, Feb. 7, 2011, 76 F.R. 7477, provided:
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense [and] the Secretary of Energy
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct the Secretaries of Defense and Energy to jointly provide annual updates to the report specified in section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (
The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.
Barack Obama.
1 So in original. The words "summary or" probably should not appear.
2 See References in Text note below.
§6115. Major warhead refurbishment program
In fiscal year 2015 and subsequent fiscal years, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report, on each major warhead refurbishment program that reaches the Phase 6.3 milestone, that provides an analysis of alternatives. Such report shall include—
(1) a full description of alternatives considered prior to the award of Phase 6.3;
(2) a comparison of the costs and benefits of each of those alternatives, to include an analysis of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives against each alternative considered;
(3) identification of the cost and risk of critical technology elements associated with each alternative, including technology maturity, integration risk, manufacturing feasibility, and demonstration needs;
(4) identification of the cost and risk of additional capital asset and infrastructure capabilities required to support production and certification of each alternative;
(5) a comparative analysis of the risks, costs, and scheduling needs for any military requirement intended to enhance warhead safety, security, or maintainability, including any requirement to consolidate and/or integrate warhead systems or mods as compared to at least one other feasible refurbishment alternative the Nuclear Weapons Council considers appropriate; and
(6) a life-cycle cost estimate for the alternative selected that details the overall cost, scope, and schedule planning assumptions.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 6115, act Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
§6116. Stockpile management program
(a)
(1) To enhance the performance and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States.
(2) To further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing.
(3) To maintain the safety and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(4) To optimize the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(5) To reduce the risk of an accidental detonation of an element of the stockpile.
(6) To reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile being used by a person or entity hostile to the United States, its vital interests, or its allies.
(b)
(1) any changes made to the stockpile shall be consistent with the objectives identified in subsection (a);
(2) any changes made to the stockpile consistent with the objectives identified in subsection (a) are carried out in a cost effective manner; and
(3) any such changes made to the stockpile shall—
(A) be well understood and certifiable without the need to resume underground nuclear weapons testing;
(B) use the design, certification, and production expertise resident in the nuclear security enterprise to fulfill current mission requirements of the existing stockpile; and
(C) develop future generations of design, certification, and production expertise in the nuclear security enterprise to support the fulfillment of mission requirements of the future stockpile.
(c)
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 6116, act Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
§6117. Annual assessments and reports to the President and Congress regarding the condition of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile
(a)
(b)
(1) The head of each national security laboratory.
(2) The Commander of the United States Strategic Command.
(c)
(1) be comprised of weapons experts from the laboratory that does not have lead responsibility for fielding the warhead being evaluated;
(2) have access to all surveillance and underground test data for all stockpile systems for use in the independent evaluations;
(3) use all relevant available data to conduct independent calculations; and
(4) pursue independent experiments to support the independent evaluations.
(d)
(1) review both the matters covered by the assessments under subsection (a) performed by the head of that laboratory and any independent evaluations conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c);
(2) subject such matters to challenge; and
(3) submit the results of such review and challenge, together with the findings and recommendations of such team with respect to such review and challenge, to the head of that laboratory.
(e)
(1) The results of each such assessment.
(2)(A) Such official's determination as to whether or not one or more underground nuclear tests are necessary to resolve any issues identified in the assessments and, if so—
(i) an identification of the specific underground nuclear tests that are necessary to resolve such issues; and
(ii) a discussion of why options other than an underground nuclear test are not available or would not resolve such issues.
(B) An identification of the specific underground nuclear tests which, while not necessary, might have value in resolving any such issues and a discussion of the anticipated value of conducting such tests.
(C) Such official's determination as to the readiness of the United States to conduct the underground nuclear tests identified under subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B), if directed by the President to do so.
(3) In the case of a report submitted by the head of a national security laboratory—
(A) a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the science-based tools and methods, including with respect to cyber assurance, being used to determine the matters covered by the assessments;
(B) a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the tools and methods employed by the manufacturing infrastructure required by section 6122 to identify and fix any inadequacy with respect to the matters covered by the assessments, and the confidence of the head in such tools and methods;
(C) a concise summary of the findings and recommendations of any teams under subsection (d) that relate to the assessments, together with a discussion of those findings and recommendations;
(D) a concise summary of the results of any independent evaluation conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c); and
(E) a concise summary of any significant finding investigations initiated or active during the previous year for which the head of the national security laboratory has full or partial responsibility.
(4) In the case of a report submitted by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command—
(A) a discussion of the relative merits of other nuclear weapon types (if any), or compensatory measures (if any) that could be taken, that could enable accomplishment of the missions of the nuclear weapon types to which the assessments relate, should such assessments identify any deficiency with respect to such nuclear weapon types;
(B) a summary of all major assembly releases in place as of the date of the report for the active and inactive nuclear weapon stockpiles; and
(C) the views of the Commander on the stockpile responsiveness program under section 6131, the activities conducted under such program, and any suggestions to improve such program.
(5) An identification and discussion of any matter having an adverse effect on the capability of the official submitting the report to accurately determine the matters covered by the assessments.
(f)
(A) each report, without change, submitted to either Secretary under subsection (e) during the preceding year;
(B) any comments that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate with respect to each such report;
(C) the conclusions that the Secretaries individually or jointly reach as to the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States; and
(D) any other information that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate.
(2) Not later than March 15 of each year, the President shall forward to Congress the matters received by the President under paragraph (1) for that year, together with any comments the President considers appropriate.
(3) If the President does not forward to Congress the matters required under paragraph (2) by the date required by such paragraph, the officials specified in subsection (b) shall provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees not later than March 30 on the report such officials submitted to the Secretary concerned under subsection (e).
(g)
(h)
(1) the Secretary of Energy, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Energy; and
(2) the Secretary of Defense, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Defense.
(Added and amended
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Amendments
2025—
§6118. Form of certifications regarding the safety or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile
Any certification submitted to the President by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy regarding confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type in the United States nuclear weapons stockpile shall be submitted in classified form only.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
§6119. Nuclear test ban readiness program
(a)
(b)
(1) To assure that the United States maintains a vigorous program of stockpile inspection and non-explosive testing so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban is entered into, the United States remains able to detect and identify potential problems in stockpile reliability and safety in existing designs of nuclear weapons.
(2) To assure that the specific materials, components, processes, and personnel needed for the remanufacture of existing nuclear weapons or the substitution of alternative nuclear warheads are available to support such remanufacture or substitution if such action becomes necessary in order to satisfy reliability and safety requirements under a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement.
(3) To assure that a vigorous program of research in areas related to nuclear weapons science and engineering is supported so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement is entered into, the United States is able to maintain a base of technical knowledge about nuclear weapons design and nuclear weapons effects.
(c)
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
§6120. Requirements for specific request for new or modified nuclear weapons
(a)
(A) shall specifically request funds for such activities in the budget of the President for that fiscal year under
(B) may carry out such activities only if amounts are authorized to be appropriated for such activities by an Act of Congress consistent with section 660 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (
(2) The activities described in this paragraph are as follows:
(A) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of research and development for the production of a new nuclear weapon by the United States.
(B) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of engineering or manufacturing to carry out the production of a new nuclear weapon by the United States.
(C) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of research and development for the production of a modified nuclear weapon by the United States.
(D) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of engineering or manufacturing to carry out the production of a modified nuclear weapon by the United States.
(b)
(c)
(1) any activities described in subsection (a)(2) relating to the development of a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon that, during the calendar year prior to the budget submission, were carried out prior to phase 2 or phase 6.2 (as the case may be) of the nuclear weapon acquisition process; and
(2) any plans to carry out, prior to phase 2 or phase 6.2 (as the case may be) of the nuclear weapon acquisition process, activities described in subsection (a)(2) relating to the development of a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon during the fiscal year covered by that budget.
(d)
(1) The term "modified nuclear weapon" means a nuclear weapon that contains a pit or canned subassembly, either of which—
(A) is in the nuclear weapons stockpile as of December 2, 2002; and
(B) is being modified in order to meet a military requirement that is other than the military requirements applicable to such nuclear weapon when first placed in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(2) The term "new nuclear weapon" means a nuclear weapon that contains a pit or canned subassembly, either of which is neither—
(A) in the nuclear weapons stockpile on December 2, 2002; nor
(B) in production as of that date.
(Added and amended
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Amendments
2025—
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Development of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons; Authorization and Limitation
§6121. Testing of nuclear weapons
(a)
(b)
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, referred to in subsec. (b), is
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
§6122. Manufacturing infrastructure for refabrication and certification of nuclear weapons stockpile
(a)
(A) To provide a stockpile surveillance engineering base.
(B) To refabricate and certify weapon components and types in the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile, as necessary.
(C) To fabricate and certify new nuclear warheads, as necessary.
(D) To support nuclear weapons.
(E) To supply sufficient tritium in support of nuclear weapons to ensure an upload hedge in the event circumstances require.
(2) The purpose of the program carried out under paragraph (1) shall also be to develop manufacturing capabilities and capacities necessary to meet the requirements specified in the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
(b)
(1) The weapons assembly and high explosives manufacturing capabilities of the Pantex Plant.
(2) The weapon secondary fabrication capabilities of the Y–12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
(3) The capabilities of the Savannah River Site relating to tritium recycling and processing.
(4) The fissile material component processing and fabrication capabilities of the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
(5) The non-nuclear component capabilities of the Kansas City National Security Campus, Kansas City, Missouri.
(Added and amended
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Amendments
2025—
§6123. Acceleration of depleted uranium manufacturing processes
(a)
(1) demonstrates bulk cold hearth melting of depleted uranium alloys to augment existing capabilities on an operational basis for war reserve components;
(2) manufactures, on a repeatable and ongoing basis, war reserve depleted uranium alloy components using net shape casting;
(3) demonstrates, if possible, a production facility to conduct routine operations for manufacturing depleted uranium alloy components outside of the current perimeter security fencing of the Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and
(4) has available high purity depleted uranium for the production of war reserve components.
(b)
(1) progress made in carrying out subsection (a);
(2) the cost of activities conducted under such subsection during the preceding fiscal year; and
(3) the ability of the nuclear security enterprise to convert depleted uranium fluoride hexafluoride to depleted uranium tetrafluoride.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 3121 of
§6124. Reports on critical difficulties at national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities
(a)
(b)
(c)
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the advanced scientific computing research program and activities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, including the functions of the Secretary of Energy relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, see
All national security functions and activities performed immediately before Oct. 5, 1999, by nuclear weapons laboratories and production facilities defined in this section, transferred to the Administrator for Nuclear Security of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy, see
§6125. Selected acquisition reports 1 and independent cost estimates and reviews of certain programs and facilities
(a)
(2) The information contained in the Selected Acquisition Report for a fiscal year for a nuclear weapon system shall be the information contained in the Selected Acquisition Report for each fiscal-year quarter in that fiscal year for a major defense acquisition program under section 4351 or any successor system, expressed in terms of the nuclear weapon system.
(b)
(A) An independent cost estimate of the following:
(i) Each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.2A or new weapon system at the completion of phase 2A, relating to design definition and cost study.
(ii) Each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.3 or new weapon system at the completion of phase 3, relating to development engineering.
(iii) Each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.4, relating to production engineering, and before the initiation of phase 6.5, relating to first production.
(iv) Each new weapon system at the completion of phase 4, relating to production engineering, and before the initiation of phase 5, relating to first production.
(v) Each new nuclear facility within the nuclear security enterprise that is estimated to cost more than $500,000,000 before such facility achieves critical decision 1 and before such facility achieves critical decision 2 in the acquisition process.
(vi) Each nuclear weapons system undergoing a major alteration project (as defined in section 6284(a)(2)).
(B) An independent cost review of each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.2 or new weapon system at the completion of phase 2, relating to study of feasibility and down-select.
(2) Each independent cost estimate and independent cost review under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) whether the cost baseline or the budget estimate for the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program has changed, and the rationale for any such change; and
(B) any views of the Secretary or the Administrator regarding such estimate or review.
(3) The Administrator shall review and consider the results of any independent cost estimate or independent cost review of a nuclear weapon system or a nuclear facility, as the case may be, under this subsection before entering the next phase of the development process of such system or the acquisition process of such facility.
(4) Except as otherwise specified in paragraph (1), each independent cost estimate or independent cost review of a nuclear weapon system or a nuclear facility under this subsection shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date on which—
(A) in the case of a nuclear weapons system, such system completes a phase specified in such paragraph; or
(B) in the case of a nuclear facility, such facility achieves critical decision 1 as specified in subparagraph (A)(v) of such paragraph.
(5) Each independent cost estimate or independent cost review submitted under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.
(c)
(Added and amended
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Amendments
2025—
1 So in original. Probably should be "Selected Acquisition Reports".
§6126. Advice to President and Congress regarding safety, security, and reliability of United States nuclear weapons stockpile
(a)
(A) to maintain a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile; and
(B) as long as other nations control or actively seek to acquire nuclear weapons, to retain a credible nuclear deterrent.
(2) It is in the security interest of the United States to sustain the United States nuclear weapons stockpile through a program of stockpile stewardship, carried out at the national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities.
(3) It is the sense of Congress that—
(A) the United States should retain a triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against the vital interests of the United States;
(B) the United States should continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to implement an effective and robust deterrent strategy; and
(C) the advice of the persons required to provide the President and Congress with assurances of the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons force should be scientifically based, without regard for politics, and of the highest quality and integrity.
(b)
(c)
(A) the safety, security, reliability, or credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear forces; or
(B) the status of, and plans for, the capabilities and infrastructure that support and sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear forces.
(2) Nothing in paragraph (1)(B) may be construed to affect the interagency budget process.
(d)
(1) Any official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
(2) Any member or official of the National Security Council.
(3) Any member or official of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(4) Any official of the Office of Management and Budget.
(Added and amended
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Amendments
2025—
Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (c).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the advanced scientific computing research program and activities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, including the functions of the Secretary of Energy relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, see
All national security functions and activities performed immediately before Oct. 5, 1999, by nuclear weapons laboratories and production plants defined in this section, transferred to the Administrator for Nuclear Security of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy, see
§6127. Notification of certain regulations that impact the National Nuclear Security Administration
(a)
(b)
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 3125 of
§6128. Plutonium pit production capacity
(a)
(1) during 2021, begins production of qualification plutonium pits;
(2) during 2024, produces not less than 10 war reserve plutonium pits;
(3) during 2025, produces not less than 20 war reserve plutonium pits;
(4) during 2026, produces not less than 30 war reserve plutonium pits; and
(5) during 2030, produces not less than 80 war reserve plutonium pits.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(2) If the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management and the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs fail to make a certification under paragraph (1) by the date specified in such paragraph with respect to a covered project achieving a critical decision milestone, the Assistant Secretary and the Deputy Administrator shall jointly submit to the congressional defense committees, by not later than 30 days after such date, a plan to ensure that the operations, infrastructure, and workforce of such project will be adequate to carry out the delivery and disposal of planned waste shipments described in such paragraph.
(e)
(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) the number of war reserve plutonium pits planned to be produced during each year, including the associated warhead type;
(B) a description of risks and challenges to meeting the performance baseline for the covered projects, as approved in critical decision 2 in the acquisition process;
(C) options available to the Administrator to balance scope, costs, and production requirements at the projects to decrease overall risk to the plutonium enterprise and enduring plutonium pit requirements; and
(D) an explanation of any changes to the production goals or requirements as compared to the report submitted during the previous year.
(f)
(1) ensure that Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, has the capability to reliably produce no fewer than 30 war reserve plutonium pits annually; and
(2) ensure that the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina, has the capability to reliably produce no fewer than 50 war reserve plutonium pits annually.
(g)
(A) carry out a project to expand the pit disassembly and processing capability of the spaces at PF–4 occupied by ARIES as of December 22, 2023; or
(B) otherwise expand such spaces.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to—
(A) ongoing or planned small projects to sustain or improve the efficiency of plutonium oxide production, provided that such projects do not expand the spaces at PF–4 occupied by ARIES as of December 22, 2023;
(B) the planning and design of an additional ARIES capability at a location other than PF–4; or
(C) the transfer of the ARIES capability to a location other than PF–4.
(3) In this subsection:
(A) The term "ARIES" means the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System method, developed and piloted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, for disassembling surplus defense plutonium pits and converting the plutonium from such pits into plutonium oxide.
(B) The term "PF–4" means the Plutonium Facility at Technical Area 55 located at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
(h)
(i)
(1) the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina (Project 21–D–511); or
(2) the Plutonium Pit Production Project, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (Project 21–D–512).
(Added and amended
Editorial Notes
Codification
Amendment by section 3112 of
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Amendments
2025—
Subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e).
Subsec. (f).
Subsec. (g).
Subsec. (i).
§6129. Certification of completion of milestones with respect to plutonium pit aging
(a)
(b)
(1) acting through the Defense Programs Advisory Committee, conduct biennial reviews during the period beginning not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and ending December 31, 2030, regarding the progress achieved toward completing the milestones described in subsection (a); and
(2) seek to enter into an arrangement with the private scientific advisory group known as JASON to conduct, not later than 2030, an assessment of plutonium pit aging.
(c)
(1) the progress achieved toward completing the milestones described in subsection (a); and
(2) the results of the assessments described in subsection (b).
(d)
(1) certify to the congressional defense committees whether the milestones described in subsection (a) have been achieved; and
(2) if the milestones have not been achieved, submit to such committees a report—
(A) describing the reasons such milestones have not been achieved;
(B) including, if the Administrator determines the Administration will not be able to meet one of such milestones, an explanation for that determination; and
(C) specifying new dates for the completion of the milestones the Administrator anticipates the Administration will meet.
(Added
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The date of the enactment of this Act, referred to in subsecs. (b)(1) and (c), is the date of enactment of
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 3124 of
§6130. Authorization of workforce development and training partnership programs within National Nuclear Security Administration
(a)
(b)
(c)
(1) The term "covered facility" means—
(A) Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico; or
(B) the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
(2) The term "prospective employee" means an individual who has applied (or who, based on their field of study and experience, is likely to apply) for a position of employment with a management and operating contractor to support plutonium pit production at a covered facility.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 3126 of
§6131. Stockpile responsiveness program
(a)
(b)
(c)
(1) Identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all of the capabilities, infrastructure, tools, and technologies across the science, engineering, design, certification, and manufacturing cycle required to carry out all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process, with respect to both the nuclear security enterprise and relevant elements of the Department of Defense.
(2) Identify, enhance, and transfer knowledge, skills, and direct experience with respect to all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process from one generation of nuclear weapon designers and engineers to the following generation.
(3) Continually demonstrate stockpile responsiveness throughout the range of capabilities as required, such as through the use of prototypes, flight testing, integrated system demonstrations, and development of plans for certification without the need for nuclear explosive testing.
(4) Develop technologies for transition to a nuclear stockpile life extension program or new nuclear weapon program project that have the potential to reduce design, certification, and manufacturing cycles cost and schedule.
(5) Continually exercise processes for the integration and coordination of all relevant elements and processes of the Administration and the Department of Defense required to ensure stockpile responsiveness.
(6) The retention of the ability, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to assess and develop prototype nuclear weapons of foreign countries if needed to meet intelligence requirements and, if necessary, to conduct no-yield testing of those prototypes.
(d)
(Added and amended
Editorial Notes
Codification
Amendment by section 3113 of
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Amendments
2025—Subsec. (c)(3).
Subsec. (c)(4).
§6132. Long-term plan for meeting national security requirements for unencumbered uranium
(a)
(b)
(1) An inventory of unencumbered uranium (other than depleted uranium), by program source and enrichment level, that, as of the date of the plan, is allocated to national security requirements.
(2) An inventory of unencumbered uranium (other than depleted uranium), by program source and enrichment level, that, as of the date of the plan, is not allocated to national security requirements but could be allocated to such requirements.
(3) An identification of national security requirements for unencumbered uranium through 2070, by program source and enrichment level.
(4) An assessment of current and projected unencumbered uranium production by private industry in the United States that could support future defense requirements.
(5) A description of any shortfall in obtaining unencumbered uranium to meet national security requirements and an assessment of whether that shortfall could be mitigated through the blending down of uranium that is of a higher enrichment level.
(6) An inventory of unencumbered depleted uranium, an assessment of the portion of that uranium that could be allocated to national security requirements through re-enrichment, and an estimate of the costs of re-enriching that uranium.
(7) A description of the swap and barter agreements involving unencumbered uranium needed to meet national security requirements that are in effect on the date of the plan.
(8) An assessment of—
(A) when additional enrichment of uranium will be required to meet national security requirements; and
(B) the options the Secretary is considering to meet such requirements, including an estimated cost and timeline for each option and a description of any changes to policy or law that the Secretary determines would be required for each option.
(9) An assessment of how options to provide additional enriched uranium to meet national security requirements could, as an additional benefit, contribute to the establishment of a sustained domestic enrichment capacity and allow the commercial sector of the United States to reduce reliance on importing uranium from adversary countries.
(c)
(d)
(e)
(1) The term "depleted", with respect to uranium, means that the uranium is depleted in uranium-235 compared with natural uranium.
(2) The term "unencumbered", with respect to uranium, means that the United States has no obligation to foreign governments to use the uranium for only peaceful purposes.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
§6133. Plan for domestic enrichment capability to satisfy Department of Defense uranium requirements
(a)
(1) a description of defense requirements for enriched uranium expected to be necessary between the date of the enactment of this Act and 2060 to meet the requirements of the Department of Defense, including quantities, material assay, and the dates by which new enrichment is required;
(2) key milestones, steps, and policy decisions required to achieve the domestic uranium enrichment capability;
(3) the dates by which such key milestones are to be achieved;
(4) a funding profile, broken down by project and sub-project, for obtaining such capability;
(5) a description of any changes in the requirement of the Department of Defense for highly enriched uranium due to AUKUS; and
(6) any other elements or information the Administrator determines appropriate.
(b)
(A) the Administration is in compliance with the plan and milestones contained in the report; or
(B) the Administration is not in compliance with such plan or milestones, together with—
(i) a description of the nature of the non-compliance;
(ii) the reasons for the non-compliance; and
(iii) a plan to achieve compliance.
(2) No report shall be required under paragraph (1) after the date on which the Administrator certifies to the congressional defense committees that the final key milestone under the plan has been met.
(c)
(Added and amended
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The date of the enactment of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, referred to in subsec. (a), is the date of enactment of
The date of the enactment of this Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(1), is the date of enactment of
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 3133 of
Amendments
2025—
Subsec. (b).
§6134. Incorporation of integrated surety architecture
(a)
(2) A shipment described in this paragraph is an over-the-road shipment of the Administration that involves any nuclear weapon planned to be in the active stockpile after 2025.
(b)
(2) A program described in this subsection is a program of the Administration that is a warhead development program, a life extension program, or a warhead major alteration program.
(c)
(2) Each determination made under paragraph (1) shall be based on a documented, system risk analysis that considers security risk reduction, operational impacts, and technical risk.
(d)
(Added and amended
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Amendments
2025—
§6135. W93 nuclear warhead acquisition process
(a)
(A) A description of the potential military characteristics of the weapon.
(B) A description of the stockpile-to-target sequence requirements of the weapon.
(C) An initial assessment of the requirements a W93 nuclear weapon program is likely to generate for the nuclear security enterprise, including—
(i) adjustments to the size and composition of the workforce;
(ii) additions to existing weapon design and production capabilities; or
(iii) additional facility recapitalization or new construction.
(D) A preliminary description of other significant requirements for a W93 nuclear weapon program, including—
(i) first production unit date;
(ii) initial operational capability date;
(iii) full operational capability date; and
(iv) any unique safety and surety requirements that could increase design complexity or cost estimate uncertainty.
(2)(A) Not later than 15 days after the date on which the Nuclear Weapons Council approves phase 2 of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle for the W93 nuclear weapon, the Administrator shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on a plan to implement a process of independent peer review or review by a board of experts, or both, with respect to—
(i) the nonnuclear components of the weapon;
(ii) subsystem design; and
(iii) engineering aspects of the weapon.
(B) The Administrator shall ensure that the process required by subparagraph (A)—
(i) uses—
(I) all relevant capabilities of the Federal Government, the defense industrial base, and institutions of higher education; and
(II) other capabilities that the Administrator determines necessary; and
(ii) informs the entire development life cycle of the W93 nuclear weapon.
(b)
(1) the administrator shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing that includes certifications that—
(A) phases 1 through 5 of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle for the weapon will employ, at a minimum, the same best practices and will provide Congress with the same level of programmatic insight as exists under the phase 6.X process for life extension programs; and
(B) the proposed design for the weapon can be carried out within estimated schedule and cost objectives; and
(2) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing, or provide to such committees a briefing on, the requirements for weapon quantity and composition by type for the sub-surface ballistic nuclear (SSBN) force, including such requirements planned for the 15-year period following the date of the report or briefing, as the case may be, including any planned life extensions, retirements, or alterations.
(c)
(d)
(Added and amended
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Amendments
2025—
Subsec. (a)(1).
Subsec. (a)(2).
§6136. Earned value management and technology readiness levels for life extension programs
(a)
(1) review and validate whether the earned value management systems of contractors of the Administration for life extension programs meet the earned value management national standard; and
(2) conduct periodic surveillance reviews of such systems to ensure that such systems maintain compliance with that standard through program completion.
(b)
(1) establish specific benchmarks for technology readiness levels of critical technologies for life extension programs at key decision points; and
(2) ensure that critical technologies meet such benchmarks at such decision points.
(c)
(d)
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
§6137. Rapid capabilities program
(a)
(b)
(1) Identify and assess potential design concepts for rapid development feasability.
(2) Carry out projects with the goal of achieving first production unit within 5 years of project initiation.
(3) Utilize non-traditional approaches, system-specific requirements, and tailored risk-acceptance processes to favorably balance cost, schedule, and capability.
(4) Maximize reuse of existing components, non-serial manufacturing, and limited production quantities.
(5) Minimize disruption to other major nuclear weapons stockpile modernization programs.
(6) Develop institutional expertise within the nuclear security enterprise for rapid execution of all phases for the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process.
(c)
(1) The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical and Biological Defense Policy and Programs.
(2) The Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy of the Joint Staff.
(3) The Director of Navy Strategic Systems Programs.
(4) The Deputy Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command.
(d)
(e)
(Added and amended
Editorial Notes
Codification
Amendment by section 3113 of
SUBCHAPTER II—TRITIUM
Editorial Notes
Codification
Subchapter analysis added pursuant to operation of
§6141. Tritium production program
(a)
(b)
(c)
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 6141 was renumbered
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
§6142. Tritium recycling
(a)
(1) All tritium recycling for weapons, including tritium refitting.
(2) All activities regarding tritium formerly carried out at the Mound Plant, Ohio.
(b)
(1) Research on tritium.
(2) Work on tritium in support of the defense inertial confinement fusion program.
(3) Provision of technical assistance to the Savannah River Site regarding the weapons surveillance program.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 6142, act Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
§6143. Modernization and consolidation of tritium recycling facilities
The Secretary of Energy shall carry out activities at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina, to—
(1) modernize and consolidate the facilities for recycling tritium from weapons; and
(2) provide a modern tritium extraction facility so as to ensure that such facilities have a capacity to recycle tritium from weapons that is adequate to meet the requirements for tritium for weapons specified in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
(Added
Editorial Notes
Prior Provisions
A prior section 6143, act Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in
Prior sections 6144 to 6147 were repealed by
Section 6144, act Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
Section 6145, act Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
Section 6146, act Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
Section 6147, act Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
A prior section 6148, acts Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
A prior section 6149, act Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,
A prior section 6150, acts Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041,